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 1 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Aim of the thesis 
The discussion paper (DP) “Preliminary Views on Insurance Contracts” issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in May 2007 builds the basis for 
this thesis. The DP contains the board’s preliminary views on “the main components 
of an accounting model for insurance contracts”1. The board gave the public the 
possibility to respond to this by integrating into the paper 20 specific questions and 1 
additional question for other comments. The answers to these questions and general 
comments are called “comment letters”. Although in the meantime further progress 
within the IASB’s project “insurance contracts” has been made, the DP from 2007 
was the first and biggest step towards building a new and extensive standard on 
insurance contracts. The recently existing exposure draft is also based on the 
preliminary views published in the DP and the comments on these.2 For that reason 
this thesis focuses on the paper from 2007. Besides the presentation of the DP’s 
contents, the focus of the thesis lies on the analysis of the comment letters. So the 
aim is to summarize the main propositions of the DP and to identify the commenters’ 
general opinions on these propositions.  
 
To make the highly number-focused analyses more readable, all numbers throughout 
the thesis are denoted in digits. Exceptions from this arrangement are technical 
terms, direct quotations and common phrases, e.g. on the one hand. 
 
1.2. Separation from the first half of the discussion paper  
Because of the high number of responses to the DP the work and analysis of all 
comment letters would have been too extensive for a single master thesis. Due to 
this the topics of the DP were split into 2 parts linked to its 6 main chapters. The first 
half deals with the topics recognition and derecognition, the measurement of 
liabilities and the affects of policyholders’ behaviour.3 This analysis can be found in 
                                                        
 
1 DP – Part 1, par. IN1. 
2 References to further IASB regulations and standards are made to their version effective at the time 
the DP was published (May 2007).  
3 cf. Höglinger (2010), p. 1. 
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the master thesis “The Commenters’ Views on the First Half of the Discussion Paper 
‘Insurance Contracts’”, by Thomas Höglinger, University of Vienna. 
 
The present thesis is about the second half of the topics covered in the DP 
“Preliminary Views on Insurance Contracts”: other issues of measurement, 
policyholder participation and changes in insurance liabilities. These contents are 
discussed in chapters 5 to 7 and questions 10 to 21 in the DP. 
 
1.3. IASB project “Insurance Contracts” 
1.3.1. Contents overview 
The board’s reason to start the project “Insurance Contracts” was that there was no 
existing standard on insurance contracts and that it was also not covered satisfyingly 
by other existing standards, i.e. the respective International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) or International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) on financial instruments. 
Also the accounting practices in regard to insurance contracts are very divers among 
countries and so the reporting is difficult to compare.4 
 
First concrete steps were taken in 1997 by setting up a steering committee. After a 
report in 2001 the IASB added this project to its agenda and split it into 2 phases.5 
The splitting should give insurers the possibility to use the results of the first phase 
already in their financial statements for 2005.6 
 
Phase I was completed by issuing the interim standard IFRS 4 “Insurance Contracts” 
in 2004.7 Right after this phase II started. The focus in this phase is to improve the 
existing standard. Regulations that have been set so far build the basis for the 
board’s further decisions, but the board does “not feel bound by it”8. This means that 
if the board finds reasonable arguments to change or replace existing regulations, it 
is possible to introduce completely new approaches. 
 
                                                        
 
4 cf. IASB Homepage: IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts – FAQ (19/07/2004), p. 3. 
5 cf. IASB Homepage: Project History. 
6 cf. IASB Homepage: IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts – FAQ (19/07/2004), p. 3. 
7 cf. IASB Homepage: Project History. 
8 IASB Homepage: IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts – FAQ (19/07/2004), p. 18. 
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In 2004 also the “Insurance Working Group” was formed to support the board in 
creating a comprehensive standard. This group consist of representatives from the 
insurance industry, accountants, actuaries and financial statements’ addressees.9 
 
One of the most important steps of the project was certainly to create the DP 
“Preliminary Views on Insurance Contracts” issued in May 2007. This paper contains 
the board’s views formed in phase II of the project. The board gave the public the 
possibility to comment on this DP until 16 November 2007. This paper was so 
important because with it the IASB introduced a new approach for measuring the 
cash flows of insurance contracts – the three building blocks. Besides, in August 
2007 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, American complement to the 
IASB) started an invitation for comments whether it should add a joint project with the 
IASB to its agenda.10 From this time on, the IASB and the FASB have been 
discussing various issues on insurance contracts together. This showed the 
willingness of the FASB to converge to standards of the IASB. At the time this thesis 
was written, the cooperation of the boards has still been in progress. As there have 
been no worldwide consistent accounting standards, future approximations between 
America and IFRSs-using countries could help to introduce consistent standards. 
 
1.3.2. Current state of the project 
1.3.2.1. Project overview 
Since 1997, first considerations on a standard for insurance contracts had been 
made. A steering committee was set up to do initial work on the project. The IASB 
was formed in 2001 and took over the project. In 2002 it was decided to split the 
project into 2 phases.11  
 
The first phase was about to set up a preliminary standard. This happened by issuing 
the IFRS 4 “Insurance Contracts” in March 2004. Phase I therefore was successfully 
completed and phase II started. 12 
                                                        
 
9 cf. Widmann (2006), p. 1840. 
10 cf. IASB Homepage: Project History. 
11 cf. IASB Homepage: Project History. 
12 cf. IASB Homepage: Project History. 
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The target of phase II is to improve and further develop the existing standard. The 
timetable below shows that the project is now already in the final spurt before the 
standard will be published. 
 
Figure 1: Project timetable 
 
Source: own illustration following IAA Homepage  
 
Between 2004 and 2007, the board developed the DP published in 2007. After 
analysing the comment letters, the IASB set up the following milestones for the final 
steps within the project: 
 
Figure 2: Last project milestones 
 
Source: IASB Homepage – Insurance Contracts 
 
After the publishing of the DP in 2007, the board did not only review the comments. 
There was also a field test conducted in phase II. In the end of 2009, the first round 
of the field test was finished and its results were also considered in the exposure 
draft. The second round took place between September 2010 and January 2011. It 
tested the proposals made in the exposure draft.13 Preliminary results have been 
reported in March 2011, but the evaluation of the second round of the field test was 
still in progress the time this thesis was written.  
                                                        
 
13 cf. IASB Homepage: Field tests: preliminary report. 
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1.3.2.2. Events since the work on the first half of the discussion paper 
The exposure draft was published in July 2010. It “proposes a single International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) that all insurers, in all jurisdictions, could apply 
to all contract types on a consistent basis”14. In January 2011, the board started to 
review the comments on the exposure draft and also continued the review of the 
comments on the DP from 2007.15 
 
For the third or fourth quarter of 2011 a ballot about the standard is planned. The 
ballot is a formal process to get the board’s approval for publishing a document, in 
this case the IFRS for insurance contracts. Each member has 1 vote. If there is 
enough support, the standard gets prepared for publication.16 Hence, the publication 
of the final version of the standard for insurance contracts is planned for the end of 
2011. 
 
It is not sure yet when exactly the effective date of the final standard version for 
insurance contracts will be. Usually it is about 6 to 18 months after the publication.17 
Currently the board is also still reviewing the comment letters received as response 
to the DP and the exposure draft. 
 
In September 2011 the IASB and FASB had their last meeting. They continued their 
discussion on disclosure requirements and risk adjustment. Further, the FASB 
reported their decisions on the single margins approach.18 
 
As this work focuses on the contents of and responses to the DP “Preliminary Views 
on Insurance Contracts”, the described developments after the deadline for 
commenting on this DP are not relevant for the aim the thesis. 
 
                                                        
 
14 IASB Homepage: Insurance Contracts. 
15 cf. IASB Homepage: Project History. 
16 cf. IASB Homepage: IASB Work Plan, p. 2. 
17 cf. IASB Homepage: IASB Work Plan, p. 2. 
18 cf. IASB Homepage: Insurance Contracts. 
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1.3.2.3. Exposure draft ED/2010/8 
As mentioned above, the issuing of the exposure draft in July 2010 was one of the 
most important milestones of the remaining project. Its aim is to replace the existing 
IFRS 4 with a new standard that matches the financial statements preparers’ needs. 
Therefore the board used the input from the DP “Insurance Contracts” and its 
comment letters, the field tests and the Insurance Working Group.19 
 
The exposure draft is still not the final version of the standard. As for the DP, there 
was a possibility for the public to comment on the board’s views in the exposure 
draft. The deadline was 30 November 2010. Even more comment letters than for the 
DP were sent this time. A total of 248 comments was sent to the board.20  
 
A detailed summary of the exposure draft’s content would exceed the extent of this 
thesis, but in the paragraphs below the most important and controversial parts will be 
outlined. Generally, the exposure draft contains “proposals on the recognition, 
measurement, presentation and disclosure of insurance contracts”21. 
 
According to the IASB, the exposure drafts offers: 
- “Unified accounting for all insurance contracts 
- Improvements to financial reporting 
- A principle-based standard that reflects the economics of insurance 
contracts”22. 
 
These aims are generally considered positive. But there is also come criticism. There 
can still be identified some accounting mismatches, like the ratio from valuation of 
financial instruments and the recognition of underwriting liabilities.23 An example is 
the fair value inclusion. The advantage is that the fair value measurement provides 
values that are close to the market. Unfortunately this also causes high volatility and 
                                                        
 
19 cf. IASB Homepage: Snapshot: Insurance Contracts, p. 3. 
20 cf. IASB Homepage: Exposure Draft Comment Letters. 
21 IASB Homepage: Snapshot: Insurance Contracts, p. 1. 
22 IASB Homepage: Snapshot: Insurance Contracts, p. 3. 
23 cf. Bonin / Kreeb (2011), p. 194. 
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therefore value fluctuations. But as the underlying business model is set up on a 
long-term basis these value fluctuations should be balanced in the course of time.24 
 
Problems can also occur with the reliability of information relating to the present 
value. Because cash flows and risk margins used for the present value are based on 
estimations, it is controversial whether it offers enough concrete and reliable 
information.25 
 
There are some inconsistencies with other standards like IAS 39 and IFRS 9 for 
financial instruments concerning the valuation. For these it is also possible to report 
at amortised costs. The exposure draft does not allow this possibility.26  
 
Generally, in a lot of European countries, the IFRSs are directly affecting only 
consolidated financial statements, whereas unconsolidated statements are usually in 
accordance to national requirements. So the planned introduction of “Solvency II” 
may be problematic. “Solvency II” is a set of regulations on capital requirements for 
all European insurance companies and involves valuation of the financial status. For 
this, valuation consistency with international standards is intended. So at least the 
regulations of the IFRS for insurance contracts will also affect unconsolidated 
financial statements.27 
 
Finally transitional regulations of the exposure draft have been criticised. For 
measuring existing liabilities, the three building blocks model has to be used without 
considering a residual margin. This may lead to a disclosure of hidden reserves.28 
 
Some of these critical points already appeared within the board’s preliminary views in 
the DP “Insurance Contracts”. The board tried to improve controversial issues of the 
DP through analysing the comments and integrating the commenters’ views into the 
exposure draft. There are still some topics that need to be discussed, but issuing the 
                                                        
 
24 cf. Kaindl (2011), p. 3 – 4; Bonin / Kreeb (2011), p. 194. 
25 cf. Kaindl (2011), p. 4. 
26 cf. Kaindl (2011), p. 4. 
27 cf. Kaindl (2011), p. 4. 
28 cf. Bonin / Kreeb (2011), p. 195. 
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exposure draft ED/2010/8 was a big step on the way to a final standard for insurance 
contracts.29 
 
1.4. Allocation of questions to the chapters of the discussion 
paper 
Parts of the comment letters refer to the questions posed in the DP. General 
comments may still refer to specific chapters. The following summary should make it 
easier for the reader to allocate the questions to the chapters of the DP. Especially 
for the chapters 2. The topics of the second half of the discussion paper and 
3. The comments on the second half of the discussion paper the table 
mentioned below provides an overview over all contents. It should be noted that the 
focus of these chapters is only on the second half of the DP. This includes the 
chapters 5 to 7 respectively questions 10 to 21 of the DP. 
 
                                                        
 
29 cf. Bonin / Kreeb (2011), p. 195. 
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Figure 3: Overview – chapters and questions of the DP 
Chapter Main content Questions More details 
Chapter 1 
Background - scope of the DP - 
Chapter 2 
Recognition and derecognition - (de)recognition of rights and obligations  Q1 
Chapter 3 
Measurement – core issues 
- measuring methods for insurance liabilities  
- the three building blocks Q2 – Q5 
Chapter 4 
Policyholder behaviour, customer 
relationships and acquisition costs 
- guaranteed insurability 
- assets related to insurance liabilities and its 
measurement and presentation 
Q6 – Q9 
“The Commenters’ Views on the First Half 
of the Discussion Paper ‘Insurance 
Contracts’”, master thesis by Thomas 
Höglinger 
 
Chapters: 
 
2 Topics of the First Half of the 
Discussion Paper  
 
3 The Comments on the First Half of the 
Discussion Paper 
Chapter 5 
Measurement – other issues 
- unit of account for risk margins  
- measurement of reinsurance assets 
- treatment of contracts with insurance and 
deposit components  
- disclosure of credit characteristics 
- differences concerning investment contracts  
Q10 – Q15 
Chapter 6 
Policyholder participation 
- estimating cash flows  
- considering possible obligations 
- participating liabilities 
Q16 – Q17 
Chapter 7 
Changes in insurance liabilities 
- presentation of premiums  
- presentation of changes in insurance 
liabilities 
Q18 – Q20 
- - other matters Q21 
Chapters: 
 
2. Topics of the second half of the 
discussion paper  
 
3. The comments on the second half of 
the discussion paper 
Source: own illustration 
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1.5. The comment letters 
1.5.1. General information about the comment letters 
When issuing the DP the board also invited the public to comment on it. The deadline 
to do so was 16 November 2007. So the commenters had about 6 months to 
respond.  
 
The respondents were asked to comment on all matters of the DP. But especially 
they were asked to answer to the specific questions posed in each chapter of the DP. 
To make their letters most helpful, the board also encouraged the commenters to 
describe alternatives if they do not like the suggested methods in the DP.30 
 
A total of 162 comment letters arrived. There were 4 comment letters that did not 
receive in time and were not taken into consideration when the board analyzed the 
comments. So the board counted 158 comment letters for their purpose. 31 
 
For the purpose of this thesis it is not essential whether the comment letters arrived 
in time or not. As already done in the first part, the whole number of 162 comment 
letters are considered to reflect the submitters’ opinion on the DP.32 
 
Because the number of responses is that high the comments were split into groups. 
The groups relate to different kinds of submitters of the letters. 
 
1.5.2. Procedure of grouping the commenters 
This thesis ties up to the evaluation of the first half and hence uses the same 
grouping. The grouping follows Thomas Höglinger in his master thesis “The 
Commenters’ Views on the First Half of the Discussion Paper ‘Insurance Contracts’” 
and identifies the following 6 groups:33 
- insurers,  
                                                        
 
30 cf. DP – Part 1, par. IN8. 
31 cf. IASB Homepage: Comment Letters. 
32 cf. Höglinger (2010), p. 24. 
33 cf. Höglinger (2010), p. 25 – 26. The grouping was conducted with regard to the commenters’ point 
of view concerning insurance contracts. 
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- actuaries,  
- accounting profession (including chattered public accountants, auditors and 
similar institutions),  
- standard setters,  
- supervisors and  
- financial service providers.  
 
Finally, 18 non-classifiable letters were consolidated under the additional group 
called others.34 Details and a formal analysis of the groups are given in the next 
chapter. 
 
1.5.3. Formal analysis of the comment letters 
1.5.3.1. Analysis with respect to the groups of commenters 
The first formal analysis gives an overview to the groups of commenters and how 
many comment letters were sent per group.  
 
Figure 4: Number of comment letters per group 
 
Source: own illustration 
 
Altogether 162 comment letters were received. Figure 4 shows that about a third of 
them (in total 55) were hand in by the group of insurers. Also, many representatives 
of the accounting profession and financial service providers commented on the DP. 
                                                        
 
34 cf. Höglinger (2010), p. 25. 
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But this does not mean that these groups also handed in the most extensive 
comments. The next graph shows the number of pages that were handed in per 
group: 
 
Figure 5: Number of pages per group 
 
Source: own illustration 
 
At first sight the figures do not differ that much. Again, about a third of the 2,151 
pages were handed in by representatives of insurers. Also in both cases, the 
supervisors present the smallest percentage. For the groups of accounting 
profession and financial service providers the numbers of both figures are pretty 
much the same. Only the groups of standard setters and actuaries show a bigger 
distinction between the number of comment letters and the number of pages. The 
difference between the number of letters sent per group and the number of pages 
written per group becomes clearer when comparing the average number of pages 
per letter received between the groups: 
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Figure 6: Average number of pages per letter per group 
 
Source: own illustration 
 
Although insurers handed in the most comment letters, their comments weren’t that 
extensive. In average, a letter from a representative of the group of insurers had 12 
pages. Representatives of the accounting profession and actuaries both handed in 
326 pages (this equals 15%, see Figure 5). But as the total amount of comment 
letters sent by actuaries is only 14, a letter from this group had in average 23 pages. 
In this group also the letter with the most pages can be found: comment letter 
number 89 with 57 pages by “The UK Actuarial Profession”. 
 
As conclusion it can be said that the groups with the highest number of comment 
letters sent (insurers, accounting profession) seem to be very interested in the design 
of the new IFRS 4. Representatives of the group of actuaries gave the most 
extensive feedback. So, for content analysis not only the number of comment letters 
and pages but also the number of pages per letter within a group is an indicator of 
how important the issues of the DP are to a particular group. 
 
1.5.3.2. Analysis with respect to geographical characteristics 
The next graph shows the number of comment letters sent per country. The group of 
others contains countries from where less than 5 letters were hand in. To this group 
belong Austria, Bermuda, Brazil, China, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Scotland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Thailand. The category “na” includes letters where the country of origin could not be 
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identified because the addressers details were missing or because the commenter is 
operating internationally and cannot be allocated to a specific country. 
 
Figure 7: Number of responses per country 
 
Source: own illustration 
 
It can clearly be seen that the Anglo-American countries commented the most on the 
DP. There are already more comment letters from England alone than from all other 
countries that sent less than 5 comment letters together. Also non-European 
countries like Australia and South Africa showed big interest and sent a noticeable 
number of comment letters. 
 
1.5.3.3. Analysis with respect to individual questions 
As the aim of this thesis is to evaluate the comments especially with respect to the 
questions posed in the DP, it is interesting to see which questions have often been 
answered to and which not. The following analysis only refers to the second half of 
the DP. To be consistent with the content analysis given in chapter 3 of this thesis, 
answers that only refer indirectly to a specific question are also taken into 
consideration. 
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Figure 8: Number of comments referring to specific questions 
 
Source: own illustration 
 
The topics in Q14 and Q13 are apparently most important to the commenters. Almost 
two thirds of all comment letters answered directly to these questions. Both questions 
belong to chapter 5 “Measurement – other issues” of the DP. Their issues are 
unbundling of insurance contracts and the measurement of insurance liabilities. 
 
Q17 and Q16 were the most infrequently addressed specific topics. These questions 
apply to chapter 6 “Policyholder participation” of the DP and the evaluation of cash 
flows. Thus this chapter seems to be less important for the commenters. 
 
There is no question all representatives of a group of commenters answered to. But 
the group of standard setters had at least 3 questions (Q11, Q13, Q14) to which 18 
out of 19 representatives answered directly. Also the group of insurers focused the 
most on Q14. The interesting thing is that all of these questions belong to chapter 5 
“Measurement – other issues” of the DP. A similar proposition can be made about 
most of the other groups, where the highest answer-participation can also be found in 
this chapter. Only the group of financial service providers does not only concentrate 
on the question in this chapter but also on Q18 and Q20 in chapter 7 “Changes in 
insurance liabilities” of the DP. This shows that within the second half of the DP, for 
the commenters the most important chapters of the DP to discuss were chapter 5 
“Measurement – other issues” and chapter 7 “Changes in insurance liabilities”. 
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Q21 gave the possibility for other comments on the DP. It is not included in this graph 
because all commenters included at least some kind of further comments on the DP 
and hence, the number of comments referring to this question would be about 100%. 
Moreover, the comments on Q21 addressed various issues and do not represent a 
specific topic or area. Thus, the rate of responses to this question does not give any 
herlpful information. 
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2. The topics of the second half of the discussion paper 
2.1. Introduction 
The DP “Preliminary Views on Insurance Contracts” consists of 2 parts. The first part 
is about the board’s preliminary views on insurance contracts. This covers the main 
text and the invitation to comment on the paper. The second part includes the 
appendices to the main text. These are the questions for respondents, a comparison 
with IAS 39, other relevant IASB projects, issues not covered in this DP, details to 
some topics in the main text and several examples. 
 
The main text has 7 chapters of which 6 contain the board’s preliminary views. The 
first chapter is an introductory chapter. For the work on this thesis the remaining 
chapters are split into 2 halves. The second half of the DP involves the chapters 5 to 
7 and will be described in the following.  
 
2.2. Measurement – other issues 
2.2.1. Assets backing insurance contracts 
The core issue of measurement is treated in chapter 3 and discusses the three 
building blocks model. In the chapter “Measurement – other issues” some more 
related issues are covered. Most of these topics are independent from each other.35 
An example of them is the occurring problem of accounting mismatches in asset 
backing insurance contracts. A main objective of phase II of the project is to eliminate 
those mismatches. For this purpose it is important to distinguish economic from 
accounting mismatches.36  
 
In the DP the following definitions are given:37 
- Economic mismatches arise if changes in economic conditions lead to 
different changes in the values of assets and liabilities. Also cash flows from 
assets or liabilities may respond differently to economic changes.  
                                                        
 
35 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 175. 
36 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 176. 
37 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 177. 
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- Accounting mismatches occur if economic changes affect assets and liabilities 
in the same way. But the carrying amounts of them do not respond equally to 
the changes. 
 
The main reason for accounting mismatches in phase I is that the measurement of 
insurance liabilities and interest-bearing financial assets does not fit together. While 
the basis for insurance liabilities does not reflect the current interest rate, for the 
according financial assets the fair-value method is used. Therefore interest rate 
changes do lead to changes in the carrying amount of the assets, but not of the 
liabilities. This leads immediately to an accounting mismatch in the income statement 
and the balance sheet for at fair value through profit or loss classified financial 
assets. For available-for-sale financial assets and assets carried at amortised costs 
the accounting mismatch occurs when selling the assets.38 
 
The board thinks that an ideal measurement model should avoid accounting 
mismatches and report economic mismatches. For this purpose the board 
considered cost-based approaches and current estimate approaches. Although there 
are some arguments for using cost-based approaches, the board thinks that current 
estimate approaches give more reliable and relevant information to the users.39 
 
Some of the board’s arguments in favour of current estimate approaches are: 40 
- Current market conditions are reflected. 
- As accounting mismatches occur mainly from insufficient measurements of 
insurance liabilities, it is important to use the method that gives the best 
information about insurance liabilities. Current estimate approaches give the 
most relevant and reliable information. 
- Cost-based approaches eliminate accounting mismatches only when 
obscuring economic mismatches, which would not advance the relevance and 
reliability of the financial statements. 
                                                        
 
38 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 178. 
39 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 179 – 180. 
40 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 180. 
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- Japan introduced a precedent for measuring assets at amortised costs. But 
this precedent also has some disadvantages, e.g. when using this option, 
significant documentation and internal control systems are required.  
- The board’s long-term objective is to measure all financial instruments at fair 
value. 
 
The board expects the insurers to use options to mitigate accounting mismatches like 
to classify financial assets at fair value through profit or loss and to use the fair value 
model for investment property if possible. But the board does not require insurers to 
do so. In this project, the board does not want to change existing IFRSs. So for some 
assets it will still not be possible to be classified at fair value through profit or loss.41 
 
2.2.2. Unit of account 
2.2.2.1. Defining the unit of account 
There are some different definitions for what a unit of account should be. The board 
prefers the description used in IFRS 4 referring to a “portfolio of contracts that are 
subject to broadly similar risks and managed together as a single portfolio’”42. 
 
2.2.2.2. Recognition and measurement 
The board comes to the conclusion that the unit of account does not affect 
recognition issues. But measurement may be important considering the unit of 
account. Insurers generally measure their obligations and rights from insurance 
contracts on a portfolio basis. This may differ from a contract-by-contract 
measurement. So the question is: does the unit of account influence the expected 
present value of future cash flows and risk margins, and how should it be determined 
considering these effects?43 
 
2.2.2.3. Expected present value of future cash flows 
The expected present value of future cash flows of a portfolio can also be defined as 
the sum of the expected cash flows of the individual insurance contracts. For some 
                                                        
 
41 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 181 – 182. 
42 DP – Part 1, par. 199;  
43 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 184 – 185. 
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kind of estimates it can be easier to determine the value on a portfolio basis. 
Principally, there should be no difference to simply aggregating the estimates of the 
individual contracts. This is why the unit of account has no effect on measurement as 
far as all relevant information, including incremental expenses, is incorporated in the 
estimated amount.44 
 
2.2.2.4. Risk margins 
There are 2 possibilities to assess risk margins. 1 of them is to determine them for 
each individual contract and then aggregate them, and the other is to determine risk 
margins immediately on an aggregated basis.45 Aggregation can be processed 
typically in 3 different ways:46 
- Pooling of risk: contracts with similar risk characteristics are pooled into 
homogenous groups. 
- Diversification of risk: a group of different risks that will compensate each other 
on average. 
- Hedging of risk: risks with negative correlation to each other are aggregated to 
offset unfavourable developments of certain objects.  
 
This leads to the possibility of a portfolio’s risk margin being smaller than the sum of 
risk margins of individual contracts or smaller portfolios. 47 Concerning this there are 
some important factors to be considered:48  
- Statistical evidence for small portfolios could be less than for large ones. The 
measurement of a portfolio should reflect all information about it, not only the 
kind of information originating within that portfolio. This is why at last insurers 
use the same statistical evidence, regardless of the level of aggregation. 
- Adverse selection can arise when transferring individual contracts. Insurers 
avoid this and typically only transfer portfolios that form a natural unit. So the 
risk margin should not include the risk of adverse selection. 
                                                        
 
44 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 186 – 187. 
45 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 190. 
46 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 190. 
47 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 191. 
48 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 192 – 201. 
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- Random fluctuations affect small portfolios more than large ones, but it can be 
reduced because it is a diversifiable risk. Some pricing models, e.g. the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), only refer to non-diversifiable risks. But 
when pricing contracts, insurers consider the contracts to be included in a 
portfolio. To be consistent with that, risk margins should be measured on a 
portfolio basis including the effects of diversifying risks, i.e. the benefits of 
pooling within a portfolio. 
- Diversification between portfolios and negative correlations between portfolios 
both lead to benefits for insurers. Depending on the unit of account including 
both portfolios or not, the risk margin reflects these benefits – or not. As the 
current exit value (CEV) has to be independent of the holding entity, risk 
margins should be determined for each portfolio individually without including 
the effects of diversification between portfolios. 
 
The board’s view is that risk margins should be determined on a portfolio basis. A 
portfolio is defined as the aggregation of insurance contracts with broadly similar 
risks that are managed together as a single portfolio. Benefits of diversification and 
negative correlations within portfolios should be reflected within the risk margins. But 
between portfolios these effects should not be included.49 
 
2.2.3. Reinsurance 
For reinsurance issues, the measurement basis for liabilities and assets needs to be 
determined. The board thinks that reinsurance liabilities should – like direct insurance 
liabilities – be measured at CEV. 50 
 
Reinsurance assets should also be measured at CEV because the board’s 
preliminary view is that cedants should measure the underlying direct insurance 
liability at CEV.51 So the scope of the standard for reinsurance contracts applies to 
insurers as well as to the insurance holder.52 
 
                                                        
 
49 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 202. 
50 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 203. 
51 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 205. 
52 cf. Grünberger (2006), p. 177. 
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But in conjunction with reinsurance assets and the CEV there are some more 
aspects to discuss:53 
- Margin for risk associated with the underlying insurance contract: Risk margins 
increase the CEV of reinsurance assets. It is also “equal in amount to the risk 
margin for the corresponding part of the underlying insurance contract”54. 
Payment for a reinsurance contract is only made if the cedant has suffered a 
loss because of the event of a claim. Because the reinsurance contract pays 
out when the cedant will most need the money, he is willing to pay more than 
the expected value for insurance. So the CEV of the reinsurance asset 
includes the transfer of the reinsurance contract and the related underlying 
contracts. 
- Impairment: There are 2 models to reduce the risk of impairment: 
(a) The incurred loss model where losses are only recognised if there exists 
evidence for the impairment, and 
(b) the expected loss model where the carrying amount for expected losses 
from default or disputes is reduced to include the risk of defaults or 
disputes exceeding the expected value. 
The board prefers the expected loss model because it is consistent with the 
CEV measurement model. 
- Gains and losses on buying reinsurance: Distortions may appear if 
reinsurance contracts do not transfer significant insurance risks. Measuring 
insurance contracts at CEV will largely avoid those distortions. 
- Non-overlapping periods of coverage: If the reinsurance contract does not 
cover the same period of time as the underlying contract, contractual rights to 
obtain reinsurance for insurance contracts that have not been issued yet can 
occur. These rights should be determined at CEV. 
 
2.2.4. Unbundling 
Unbundling generally means to split an insurance contract into its components and 
treat them like different contracts in the financial statements. Insurance contracts 
always have several components because policyholders pay the premiums in 
                                                        
 
53 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 206 – 218. 
54 DP – Part 1, par. 219. 
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advance which leads to a deposit component. Components of a separate deposit 
contract may be treated differently because there are different measurement models 
within IFRSs.55 
 
The most relevant models are the CEV (in phase II) for rights and obligations under 
insurance contracts, the amortised costs or the fair value for financial instruments 
and the stage of completion of the transaction for revenues from service contracts. 
These models bear some inconsistencies that cannot be eliminated but at least 
minimized by separating the deposit and service components – thus unbundling. Also 
the existing IFRS 4 requires unbundling if the affected components can be measured 
separately and would otherwise not be recognised.56 
 
There are various arguments for and against unbundling. The following table gives 
an overview thereof: 
 
Figure 9: Arguments for and against unbundling 
+ – 
insurers and issuers of separate financial 
instruments account in the same way 
the sum of the unbundled values of the 
components may differ from the value of the 
underlying product 
same accounting for contracts regardless of 
whether a contract transfers enough risk to 
be defined as an insurance contract or not 
insurance contracts present a package of 
benefits that cannot be terminated or sold 
individually 
distinction between premium revenue 
earned for accepting insurance risk and 
investment or deposit receipts 
measurement of deposit components could 
be arbitrary because of interdependencies 
between components 
- 
for information about gross premium flows 
absolutely all or absolutely no products 
should be unbundled 
Source: own illustration following DP – Part 1, par. 225 – 226 
 
                                                        
 
55 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 220 – 221. 
56 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 221 – 224. 
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The board’s view depends on whether the components of the insurance contract are 
interdependent or not. Interdependent components that cannot be measured 
separately lead to an application of the phase II standard on insurance contracts to 
the whole contract. If the components are not interdependent from each other, the 
phase II standard should be used for the insurance components. The deposit 
components then should be treated under IAS 39. It can occur that the components 
are interdependent but nevertheless can be measured separately on a non-arbitrary 
basis. In this case IAS 39 should apply to the deposit component. The whole contract 
would be measured under the phase II standard. The difference between these 
measurements builds the basis for the insurance component.57 
 
2.2.5. Credit characteristics of insurance liabilities 
When measuring insurance liabilities, the question arises whether the measurement 
should reflect their credit characteristics or not. There are proponents and arguments 
in favour of both points of view. For example some argue that adjustments for credit 
characteristics are not reliably measurable and therefore should not be considered. 
On the other hand an argument is that if insurance liabilities are measured at CEV, it 
is arbitrary not to include the effects of an insurer’s credit standing for measuring 
purposes.58  
 
The board’s preliminary view is that “the current exit value of a liability is the price for 
a transfer that neither improves nor impairs its credit characteristics”59. Therefore 
measuring liabilities at CEV should reflect those characteristics. The effects of credit 
characteristics on the initial measurement and subsequent changes of an insurance 
liability should be disclosed by the insurer.60 This is because changes in the credit 
characteristics may form relevant information that is used to estimate market prices 
for benchmarking.61 
                                                        
 
57 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 228. 
58 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 230 – 231. 
59 DP – Part 1, par. 232. 
60 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 232. 
61 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 231. 
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2.2.6. Investment contracts 
Some insurance contracts do not transfer significant insurance risk. Consequently 
they are falling within the scope of IAS 39 for financial instruments. The problem is 
that there are differences between the board’s preliminary views on insurance 
contracts and the requirements in IAS 39 for financial instruments and IAS 18 for 
revenue. The board wishes to eliminate those differences but does not present 
proposals for that within the DP.62  
 
Some of the main problematic issues are:63 
- Initial measurement under IAS 39 and IAS 18 is at fair value. The DP 
proposes to measure insurance contracts initially at CEV. Similar regulations 
affect subsequent measurement. 
- Under the proposed model in the DP significant gain or loss at inception could 
be identified if the pricing does not meet the requirements of the market 
participants. In this case, an insurer would have to check for errors or 
omissions. 
- The unit of account is not determined in the same way in the respective 
standards. 
- There are some components that would not be recognised consistently among 
the standards. 
 
2.3. Policyholder participation 
2.3.1. Participating contracts 
2.3.1.1. Background 
Some insurance or investment contracts give the policyholder also the right to benefit 
from positive performance of the relevant class of contracts or related assets besides 
guaranteed benefits. This forms the policyholder participation right which leads to a 
participating contract. 64 
 
                                                        
 
62 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 233. 
63 cf. DP – Part 2, Appendix B Comparison with IAS 39, p. 10 – 13.  
64 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 236. 
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In the existing IFRS 4 a definition for so called “discretionary participation feature” is 
given and will be reviewed in phase II of the board’s project. This definition of a 
“contractual right to receive as a supplement to guaranteed benefit, additional 
benefits”65 with certain characteristics includes controversial components of 
discretion on the one hand and constraint on the other. The insurer has discretion 
over the amount and timing of the payment, constrained through contractual or legal 
regulations. Therefore it is difficult to decide whether such policyholder participation 
rights lead to a liability for the insurer.66 
 
2.3.1.2. How participating contracts work 
The charged premiums of participating contracts are larger than those for non-
participating contracts. The exceeding part of the premium will be (partly) refunded 
by the insurer if the outcomes meet the insurer’s expectations. While in non-
participating contracts the insurer bears the whole risk, the policyholders in 
participating contracts bear the risk up to a certain level.67 
 
The following graph gives some examples where this difference in risk-bearing is 
shown: 
 
                                                        
 
65 DP – Part 1, par. 237. 
66 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 236 – 238. 
67 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 239 – 241. 
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Figure 10: Comparison of non-participating contracts and participating contracts 
currency
non-participating contracts
expected future claims and losses -80
charged premium 89
compensation for risk-bearing 9
participating contracts
1) expected future claims and losses -80
charged premium 100
dividend -13
target-margin 7
2) expected future claims and losses <80 -70
charged premium 100
dividend -23         policyholder bears risk
target-margin 7         --> lower target margin as 
 --> higher dividend              for non-participating contracts
3) expected future claims and losses >80 -90
charged premium 100
dividend -3
target-margin 7
 --> smaller dividend
4) expected future claims and losses >93 -95
charged premium 100         insurer bears risk
dividend 0
target-margin 5  
Source: own illustration following DP – Part 1, par. 239 – 240 
 
The procedure of sharing favourable performances with policyholders typically 
involves 3 steps:68 
1. Determination of the distributed amount (e.g. profit for the current period). 
2. Allocation of the distributable amount to classes of policyholders (level of 
aggregation may be determined by the underlying contracts).  
3. Distribution of the amount specified in step 2. to individual policyholders 
(various forms possible, e.g. cash, additions to surrender values). 
 
                                                        
 
68 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 242. 
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2.3.1.3. Definition of a liability 
For participating contracts the question arises whether the policyholder participation 
rights lead to a present obligation for the insurer to pay dividends. The board refers to 
the precedent given in IAS 37 “Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent 
Assets”. There are 2 defined categories:69 
- Legal obligations: An obligation that comes from a contract through explicit or 
implicit terms. 
- Constructive obligations: An obligation that comes from an entity’s action that 
indicated that it is willing to accept certain responsibilities and in order to that 
created a valid expectation on the affected parties. Such constructive 
obligations may occur from insurance contracts with policyholder participation. 
 
The board’s preliminary view is, that “the cash flows used in measuring a 
participating insurance liability should incorporate for each scenario an unbiased 
estimate of the policyholder dividends payable in that scenario to satisfy a legal or 
constructive obligation that exists at the reporting date”70. Whether such an obligation 
exists may depend on the particular underlying contracts and facts. Therefore the 
detailed guidance in IAS 37 has to be considered.71 
 
For more clearness, an accurate disclosure concerning guaranteed benefits and 
participating benefits in the financial statements is necessary. In phase II of the 
project the board will consider accordant disclosure requirements.72 
 
2.3.1.4. Measurement of participating contracts 
When measuring participating contracts 2 issues arise:73 
- The approach to embedded options and guarantees: Participating contracts  
create asymmetric pay-offs that are similar to embedded options or 
guarantees. 
                                                        
 
69 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 247 – 251. 
70 DP – Part 1, par. 254. 
71 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 255. 
72 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 258. 
73 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 259 – 260. 
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- The discount rate: Discount rates should depend on the characteristics of the 
liability. But within participating liabilities some cash flows from the liability may 
depend on the cash flows from the underlying assets. 
 
The basis for measuring asset-dependent cash flows and for measuring the 
underlying assets has to be consistent.74 
 
2.3.2. Universal life contracts 
2.3.2.1. Definition of universal life contracts 
The board uses the definition of the American Council of Life Insurers: “A type of 
permanent life insurance that allows you, after your initial payment, to pay premiums 
at any time, in virtually any amount, subject to certain minimums and maximums. 
This policy also permits you to reduce or increase the death benefit more easily than 
under a traditional whole life policy. To increase your death benefit, the insurance 
company usually requires you to furnish satisfactory evidence of your continued good 
health”75. 
 
A typical universal life contract proceeds in the following way: First, premiums are 
added to a policyholder account. The premiums can be varied by the policyholder up 
to a certain degree. Mortality coverage is provided as long as the policyholder 
account is funded. Based on the balance of this account, interest is added. Mortality 
charges and some costs for administration or acquisition are deducted from the 
policyholder account. Withdrawals of the account can contractually be appointed.76 
 
2.3.2.2. Crediting rates 
Asset returns can affect crediting rates. This can have a similar effect like 
participating contracts based on returns on assets. This is an argument to account 
the interest credited to universal life contracts the same way as dividends paid 
because of policyholder participation rights. Some argue that it is already adequate to 
measure the liability on the minimum crediting rate guaranteed to the policyholder. 
                                                        
 
74 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 261. 
75 DP – Part 1, par. 262. 
76 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 263. 
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The board thinks that this minimum-based measuring does not provide enough 
useful information. Instead of this, the estimated crediting rates should reflect the 
estimated rates payable in the particular scenarios to satisfy legal and constructive 
obligations.77 
 
2.3.2.3. Future cash flows 
Generally, the board thinks that the measurement of an insurance liability should 
include the premiums paid to retain guaranteed insurability (“guaranteed insurability 
test”).78 This works well if the future premiums are specified in the insurance contract. 
But as the premiums for universal life contracts can be varied by the policyholder, not 
all premiums may pass the test.79 
 
2.3.3. Unit-linked contracts 
2.3.3.1. Parameters of unit-linked contracts 
Unit-linked contracts are insurance contracts where some or all unit-linked benefits 
for the policyholder are determined by the price of units in an investment fund. The 
paper uses the terms of separate account assets for the corresponding pool of 
assets and general account assets for all other assets of the insurer. Depending on 
whether the assets in the fund are part of the insurer’s activities or not, it could be 
relevant for the insurer whether to recognise these assets. The premium paid by the 
policyholder is typically used to buy units in a fund. Unit prices reflect the fair value of 
the fund’s assets. Deduction and charges are often made for a front-end fee, bid-ask 
spreads, administration costs, insurance coverage and tax.80 
 
Unit-linked contracts bring up some difficulties in accounting that are discussed in the 
following chapters. A question is whether the insurer should recognise the assets 
pool and its related liabilities. Another problem deals with accounting mismatches 
because of different measurement of the underlying assets and related liabilities.81  
                                                        
 
77 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 265 – 267. 
78 This is discussed in detail in chapter 4 of the DP, which is not focus of this thesis. Thus, more 
information can be found in Höglinger (2010). 
79 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 268. 
80 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 269 – 270. 
81 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 271. 
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2.3.3.2. Recognition and presentation of separate account assets 
The board discusses 3 treatments for separate account assets:82 
‐ Separate account assets and the related liabilities could be excluded from the 
balance sheet. If the liability is only partly related and includes also other 
parts, this will be adequately recognised. This would reflect the fact that the 
insurer only has indirect benefits from these assets and does not bear the 
entire risk. 
‐ Separate account assets could be included in the balance sheet as a single 
line item besides the general account assets. The complete liability could then 
also be included as a line item. This method would be proper if the insurer 
must satisfy the whole obligation and meets the fact that the insurer at last 
controls the investment decision. 
‐ The third method would be to include separate account assets within the 
general account assets, but to present the entire liability as a line item. As 
within the second method this goes with the insurers control over investment 
decisions. Also it puts assets with same characteristics in the same line item 
group. 
 
There are some arguments for and against each of these methods, but the board had 
not formed a preliminary view on that the time the DP was issued.83 
 
2.3.3.3. Accounting mismatches for unit-linked contracts 
There are situations where the unit-linked assets cannot be classified as fair value 
through profit or loss, which leads to accounting mismatches because of different 
measurements. This happens if those assets cannot be recognised, or can be 
recognised but not measured at fair value (e.g. not financial assets but inventories.). 
Even if unit-linked assets are measured at fair value, account mismatches can occur 
if changes in the fair value are not recognised within profit or loss.84 
 
                                                        
 
82 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 273 – 276. 
83 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 277. 
84 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 278. 
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To avoid such accounting mismatches the board presents 2 approaches:85 
- The treatment concerning the recognition and measurement of separate 
account assets could be changed, so that fair value through profit or loss 
applies. This proceeding would require some exceptions to the existing 
requirements of recognition and measurement and the board may have to 
introduce a new definition of separate account assets. Alternatively a broader 
principle on accounting for “assets held for other parties” could be defined. 
- The measurement of unit-linked liabilities could be adjusted to avoid 
differences between the carrying amount and the fair value of separate 
account assets. A counter-argument is that such adjustments would be an 
override of general measurement principles – the CEV. Others argue that it 
would only be an application instead of a modification of the CEV. This is 
because of the linkage between the unit-linked liability and the fair value of the 
underlying asset. A transfer of the liability without the linked asset is not likely. 
 
However, eliminating these accounting mismatches through the mentioned methods 
would lead to inconsistencies with other IFRSs’ requirements. Also in this case the 
board had not formed a concrete preliminary view on whether it is appropriate to put 
up with such inconsistencies at the time the DP was issued.86 
 
2.3.4. Index-linked contracts 
An index-linked contract exists if an insurance or financial liability is linked to an 
index. The issuer, respectively insurer, is not contractually obligated to hold the 
underlying assets and hence, could transfer liabilities without transferring the assets 
too. If the assets are held and not measured at fair value through profit or loss, it will 
have effects on profit or loss of the insurer. The board does not yield to arguments of 
some who claim either to allow measurement at fair value through profit or loss or to 
adjust the measurement to the index-linked liability.87  
 
                                                        
 
85 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 279 – 283. 
86 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 286. 
87 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 287 – 288. 
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The board’s view is that the existing requirements in IFRSs are already “appropriate 
for assets held to back index-linked contracts”88. So the board does not suggest 
inserting further regulations. 
 
2.4. Changes in insurance liabilities 
2.4.1. Presentation of insurance premiums as revenue or deposit 
2.4.1.1. Components of an insurance premium 
With the insurance premium the policyholder pays primarily for the expected present 
value of benefit payments to him. A typical example for this is payment to 
policyholders because they experienced insured losses. But also the dividends paid 
within participating contracts and repayments for some kind of insurance contracts, 
e.g. annuities or group insurance contracts, are benefit payments. These payments 
can be seen as repayments of deposits, either to individual policyholders or the 
policyholders as a group. The premium also covers acquisition costs, margins for 
bearing risks and providing services and the expected present value of other 
expenses.89  
 
The board describes all contractual features that lead to (re)payment to policyholders 
as a deposit component. This is valid for individual and collective payments. The 
broadness of the definition for deposit components is not specified any further.90  
 
2.4.1.2. Some details of the revenue and deposit approaches 
Generally, there are 2 approaches for presenting deposit components of an 
insurance contract:91  
- 1 possibility is to present deposit premiums as revenue and the resulting 
payments as an expense.  
- The other is to present premiums as a deposit receipt and the payments as a 
repayment of the deposit to the policyholders.  
 
                                                        
 
88 DP – Part 1, par. 295. 
89 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 298 – 299. 
90 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 300. 
91 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 301. 
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But beside this general consideration, several details of the revenue and deposit 
approaches may have some impact on the presentation:92 
- A difference between life and non-life presentations: Non-life presentations 
show the premium as a liability in the beginning. Later it is recognised as 
revenue over time as it is earned. The board describes it as a cost-based 
measure of an insurer’s obligation to be able to pay valid claims. Within life 
presentation written premiums are presented as revenue as soon as they are 
due, not when they are earned. At the same time, an expense equal to the 
associated change in the liability is recognised. Hence the difference between 
these presentations is that the line items differ. This is because life insurances 
are long-termed, whereas non-life contracts are traditional one year long.  
- Premiums written: As in non-life contracts insurers often present premiums in 
2 stages. During the period they are shown as premiums written, which 
became unconditionally receivable during the period. 
- Unearned premiums: Unearned premiums are also written premiums but their 
insurance coverage period has not yet expired. Changes in unearned 
premiums are deducted which leads to premiums earned. 
- Premiums earned: These premiums during a period are “premiums for 
insurance coverage during that period”93. The problem arising here is to 
determine when each part of the premium is earned. This involves some 
processes and topics that have been discussed in the earlier chapter 3 of the 
DP “Measurement – core issues”, e.g. estimating remaining cash flows. 
 
The second part of the DP gives a few examples to line out the differences of these 
inclusions.94  
 
2.4.1.3. Possible approaches for presenting insurance premiums 
There are 3 possible approaches to present insurance premiums:95  
‐ The same treatment for all contracts: This would mean that either all premiums 
are shown as revenue or as deposit receipts. 
                                                        
 
92 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 308 – 315. 
93 DP – Part 1, par. 312. 
94 These examples can be found in the DP – Part 2, Appendix G Examples, p. 61 – 68. 
95 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 316. 
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‐ Different treatments for different classes of contracts: The treatment would 
differ between classes of contracts either addictive to specified criteria or by 
choice of the insurer. 
‐ Unbundling: Premiums could be unbundled into a deposit receipt and a 
revenue receipt. This might happen for all or only specified insurance 
contracts. 
 
There are different arguments for and against those methods including the 
consistency with current existing praxis, the complexity or simplicity of the method 
and some disadvantages of unbundling. The board thinks it is important how 
premiums are treated, especially as many insurers use the total premium revenue as 
the top indicator of the size of their business. But, the time the paper was issued the 
board had not built a preliminary view on how to treat premiums. For doing so the 
appropriateness of unbundling in the balance sheet and developments in the FASB’s 
project on insurance risk transfer will also be considered.96 
 
2.4.2. Changes in the carrying amount of insurance liabilities 
There are several reasons why the carrying amount of insurance liabilities can 
change:97 
- Income or expense recognised at the inception of new contracts. 
- Receipt of previously expected cash inflows or payment of previously 
expected cash outflows. 
- Changes that are expected, e.g. release of previous risk or service margins. 
- Changes in circumstances like in discount rates, estimated cash flows or 
differences between previous estimated and actual cash flows. 
- Any kind of policyholder participation. 
- Income or expense because of held reinsurances relating to the underlying 
direct insurance contract. 
- Possible effects of business combinations and changes in foreign exchange 
rates. 
 
                                                        
 
96 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 317 – 324. 
97 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 325. 
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Acquisition costs and accordingly the part of the premium covering these costs are 
also related to the insurance liability. This and the mentioned reasons for changes in 
insurance liabilities lead to different implications for users when estimating an 
insurer’s future cash flows. The question arising is how detailed the income 
statements of insurers should report about the changes in the carrying amount of 
insurance liabilities and its catalysts. Therefore the board is broadly considering how 
to disaggregate and display income and expenses within own projects.98 
 
2.4.3. Presentation in profit or loss  
Some argue it would be consistent with regulations of IAS 39 for financial instruments 
to permit insurers to present effects of remeasuring insurance liabilities outside profit 
or loss. But the board sees no reason to exclude any changes from profit or loss.99  
 
Relating to changes in insurance liabilities, the existing IFRS 4 knows and permits in 
some accounting models a practice called shadow accounting. This means that 
some of the changes in insurance liabilities are recognised outside profit or loss 
through equity. As shadow accounting is only possible in some cases that are 
anyway partly avoided through the preliminary views presented in this DP, the board 
does not intend to permit shadow accounting and sticks to its view that all changes in 
the carrying amount of insurance liabilities should be included in profit or loss.100 
 
                                                        
 
98 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 326 – 328. 
99 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 329. 
100 cf. DP – Part 1, par. 334 – 337. 
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3. The comments on the second half of the discussion 
paper 
3.1. Introduction 
The 162 comment letters contained a total of 2,093 pages. To make it easier to 
analyse the comments, the letters were split into groups. Therefore the submitters of 
the comment letters had to be identified. A table of all comment letters was set up. It 
includes information about the consecutive number of the comment letter, number of 
pages, submitter, land of origin and group. 101 
 
The first step of analysing the comments was to prepare another table listing all 
commenters sorted after groups and the questions 10 to 21. Then it was noted 
whether a certain commenter had replied to a certain question. For this purpose, all 
comments that refer to a question specifically enough were considered, even if the 
commenter had not stated it explicitly under a title referring to a certain question. 
Then, each comment was summarized and written into the particular cell of the table. 
After that, comments with the same view were marked. Then a short overview of how 
many commenters (dis)agree with the board’s view was made. This basic information 
is used to identify general tendencies. Frequently mentioned or striking comments 
are used in the analysis to point out the commenters’ views. The analysis given for 
question 21 is not so detailed because of the enormous number and variety of 
comments that fall under the scope of this question. 
 
The structure of the analyses is the same for all questions: First the question is 
presented. Then the responses from the groups are recapitulated in the following 
order: insurers, actuaries, accounting profession, standard setters, supervisors, 
financial service providers and others. Finally a short summary over all comments to 
the underlying question is given to point out a trend – if possible. Footnotes that refer 
to certain statements in the comment letters include the page numbers given in the 
concerning letter. If a letter is not numbered, its pages are simply counted starting at 
the covering letter. 
                                                        
 
101 cf. Höglinger (2010), p. 25. A detailed description of the procedure of grouping the comment letters 
and the groups itself can be found in Höglinger (2010). See also Appendix A: List of commenters. 
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3.2. The commenters’ views on the measurement of assets 
held to back insurance liabilities 
3.2.1. Question 10 
Do you have any comments on the measurement of assets held to back insurance 
liabilities? 
 
3.2.2. Insurers 
There are 27 out of 55 insurers answering directly to question number 10. Generally 
2 tendencies within the comments can be identified. On the one hand there are 
proponents of using the option under IAS 39 to measure assets held to back 
insurance liabilities at fair value. On the other hand the opponents of this view do not 
support using the fair value measurement approach for these assets. 
 
The bigger part of the commenters belongs to the group supporting the fair value 
approach. These 19 proponents mostly use the argument that accounting 
mismatches arise from different measurement approaches for liabilities and related 
assets. All of the 19 commenters agree with the board’s intention to eliminate these 
accounting mismatches as far as possible in phase II of the project. Therefore they 
support a consistent measurement of insurance liabilities and assets backing them. 
The DP proposes the CEV for liabilities. To achieve consistency, assets should be 
measured at fair value if possible.  
 
17 of these commenters think that the existing fair value option under IAS 39 is 
sufficient. Under this option a lot of financial assets can be categorized as fair value 
through profit or loss. The remaining 2 commenters even argue that the restrictions 
of this IAS 39 option should be removed to make it possible for all assets held to 
back insurance contracts to be valued at fair value. Most of them also suggest the 
board to offer a one-time re-designation provision when adopting the new IFRS for 
insurance contracts.  
 
A small group of 8 commenters does not support this view. They do not support 
measuring assets held to back insurance liabilities at fair value. 1 argues instead that 
“transparency and comparability of performance can be achieved through 
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appropriate levels of disclosure”102. But these 8 commenters mainly argue that the 
board generally proposes the wrong approach for measuring assets or liabilities. The 
board supports current estimate approaches and for liabilities especially the CEV. An 
argument against that is that “the board has not provided sufficient credible 
research”103 that the CEV-based measurement provides best relevant and reliable 
information for liabilities. According to that, the fair value for assets backing these 
liabilities is not the best measuring method for proponents of this view. 
 
Altogether there seems to be a tendency amongst insurers towards preferring the fair 
value measurement for assets held to back liabilities. Some even want to open the 
fair value option under IAS 39 to more assets. A few opponents of this argue 
especially against the suggested use of the CEV for liabilities.  
 
3.2.3. Actuaries 
Only 7 of the 14 representatives of the group of actuaries answer to this question. 
The comments are quite homogenous. Most actuaries mention that assets should be 
valued at fair value to be consistent with the CEV approach of insurance liabilities, 
especially when the assets are held to back these liabilities. There are no comments 
against the use of the fair value for assets. As within the group of insurers there were 
2 commenters even thinking that the fair value option should be compulsory and 
“extended to those assets for which a fair value option is not now available”104.  
 
3.2.4. Accounting profession 
18 out of 28 commenters of this group answer to question number 10. The clear 
majority of 14 out of these 18 comments displays a positive attitude to the use of the 
fair value for assets backing insurance liabilities. 7 of these commenters even think 
that the board should “grant a transitional provision to allow the reclassification of 
financial assets into the category of financial instruments at fair value through profit 
                                                        
 
102 CL 4, p. 6. 
103 CL 102, p. 30. 
104 CL 111, p. 8. 
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or loss”105. Most comments include the statement that the use of the fair value option 
under IAS 39 will minimize accounting mismatches. 
 
3 commenters think that there should be no special rule or exception for the 
measurement of assets held to back insurance liabilities. Existing rules should be 
used for valuing assets. 1 commenter proposes the following accounting method: 
Assets and matching liabilities where the “risk and reward reside with the 
policyholder should be excluded from the balance sheet and only cash flows to / from 
the shareholder taken into account”106.  
 
3.2.5. Standard setters 
There are 17 out of 19 standard setters that answer to this question. Like within the 
groups above, the majority argues in favour of measuring assets held to back 
insurance liabilities at fair value. Again the following arguments are mentioned: 
- The new standard should avoid accounting mismatches. 
- Consistent measurement between liabilities and (related) assets is desirable.  
- Measuring liabilities at CEV and assets at fair value will avoid accounting 
mismatches. 
 
3 commenters suggest some kind of extension of the IAS 39 fair value option. Either 
through disposing any constraints for using this option or permitting a “re-designation 
of financial assets between the categories under IAS 39 when the new IFRS is first 
applied”107. 2 commenters only mention that the board should take actions to avoid 
accounting mismatches.  
 
3.2.6. Supervisors 
Only 7 commenters fall into the group of supervisors. 4 of those do not answer 
directly to this question. The remaining 3 commenters mention the importance of 
consistency with the measurement of liabilities at CEV. Assets should be measured 
                                                        
 
105 CL 92, p. A-10. 
106 CL 60, p. 8. 
107 CL 132, p. 9. 
 41 
at fair value when it is appropriate. Similar to the other groups, an extension of the 
IAS 39 fair value option is proposed. 
 
3.2.7. Financial service providers 
Only 11 of 21 financial service providers comment on this matter. There are no 
comments against the use of the fair value for assets held to back insurance 
liabilities. Nevertheless, there can be 2 types of views identified: 
- 1 is that measuring assets at fair value should only be an option and not the 
only method. The existing options under IFRSs (e.g. the IAS 39 fair value 
option) are satisfactory and will fairly remove accounting mismatches. 4 
commenters share this view. 
- The other 7 commenters support the valuation of assets at fair value even 
more intensely. They assume that insurers will try to use the fair value option 
in any case. Hence these commenters suggest to extend such options to all 
kinds of assets or to provide the possibility to re-designate assets under the 
new standard.  
 
1 commenter mentions that even if all assets are measured at fair value and liabilities 
at CEV, there could still arise some accounting mismatches “due to the fact that 
assets and liabilities would not be measured using the same current valuation basis 
model”108. All in all there is still the same tendency amongst financial service 
providers. 
 
3.2.8. Others 
In this group 10 commenters do not answer this question. 8 commenters give their 
views on assets held to back insurance liabilities. Only 1 commenter is against the 
use of the fair value for assets. This commenter does not share the board’s view that 
other valuation methods would be more costly and time-consuming than an exit price 
valuation. His argument is that an exit price valuation also costs time and money 
because the company would have to explain this accounting method “which includes 
                                                        
 
108 CL 157, p. 8. 
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volatility and/or material amounts which are unrelated to the actual flows of economic 
resources that will occur”109. 
 
The other 7 commenters mention that there should be consistency in measuring 
assets and liabilities in order to avoid accounting mismatches. Current estimate 
approaches and the fair value option under IAS 39 should be used. 
 
3.2.9. Summary 
Although not all groups are homogenous, the prevalent view is that assets held to 
back insurance liabilities should be valued at fair value. The board suggests to value 
liabilities at CEV. As the majority wants to avoid accounting mismatches through 
consistency in measurement, the suitable method for related assets is to use the fair 
value options. Especially Australian commenters support this view as there is an 
“Australian concept of fair value treatment through the Income Statement, for both 
assets and liabilities associated with insurance contracts”110 and they would be 
concerned if this approach is “not mandated elsewhere in the world”111. 
 
Some commenters require broader application possibilities for the fair value option 
under IAS 39. A frequent suggestion therefore is the granting of a one-time 
transitional regulation to re-designate assets when issuing the new standard for 
insurance liabilities.  
 
A lot of comments do not refer directly to the measuring of assets held to back 
insurance liability. They discuss the issue of measuring insurance liabilities and 
consistency in measurement of assets and liabilities generally. Hence, they only refer 
indirectly to assets backing insurance liabilities. 
 
                                                        
 
109 CL 107, p. 4. 
110 CL 13, p. 9.  
111 CL 13, p. 9. 
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3.3. The commenters’ views on risk margins 
3.3.1. Question 11 
Should risk margins: 
(a)  be determined for a portfolio of insurance contracts? Why or why not? If yes, 
should the portfolio be defined as in IFRS 4 (a portfolio of contracts that are 
subject to broadly similar risks and managed together as a single portfolio)? 
Why or why not? 
(b)  reflect the benefits of diversification between (and negative correlation between) 
portfolios? Why or why not? 
 
3.3.2. Insurers 
31 insurers reply to this question. There are 2 comments that just mention that risk 
margins should not be used for the valuation of non-life reserves at all, and give no 
further comment. Within the remaining 29 comments only 4 are disagreeing with the 
board’s view on the first part of the question whether risk margins should be 
determined for a portfolio of insurance contracts. These commenters prefer risk 
margins to be determined on an entity level. They argue that “this is consistent with 
how an insurer manages its business”112. Another argument a commenter stated is 
that risk margins on an entity level provide “more meaningful and information on the 
risks of the business”113, especially for the users of the financial statements.  
 
3 comment letters do not refer to the first part of the question. All of the remaining 
insurers (22) agree with the board’s view and support the determination of risk 
margins on a portfolio level. The most interesting thing about this is that they use the 
same argument as the opponents of this view: the portfolio level reflects how insurers 
manage their business! There are some consistently mentioned arguments to 
support this position: 
‐ The portfolio represents the main essence of the insurance concept, which is 
based on the pooling of risk. 
                                                        
 
112 CL 136, p. 7. 
113 CL 144, p. 9. 
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‐ This aggregation level is most consistent with how insurers price their 
products. 
‐ Managers usually manage the business on a portfolio basis. 
‐ The financial statements should reflect the above mentioned characteristics. 
 
But the proponents of a portfolio basis do not present a homogenous picture on the 
definition of a portfolio. Only 9 insurers support the board’s view to keep the existing 
definition in IFRS 4. There are also 9 commenters mentioning their concern that the 
existing definition may not be broad enough for some insurers. Especially the terms 
“contracts” and “broadly similar risks” are criticised. 4 insurers do not specifically 
comment on this. 
 
The board’s view on the second part of the question is that benefits of diversification 
and negative correlations between portfolios should not be reflected by the risk 
margins. Only 5 commenters share this view. The bigger part of 24 insurers thinks 
that these benefits should be considered. Their main argument is that this would 
reveal best how the business model works and hence should be reflected within the 
financial statements. 
 
3.3.3. Actuaries 
There are only 3 out of 14 actuaries that do not answer to this question. The majority 
of 5 commenters agrees with the board’s view on both parts of the question. This 
means they support a portfolio level for the determination of risk margins and the 
proposed definition of what a portfolio is. The arguments for these views are about 
the same as within the group of insurers. Additionally some actuaries mention 
practical matters like that “there is no practical use to which a finer subdivision of risk 
margins can be put”114. They also agree on not including the benefits of 
diversification and negative correlation between portfolios. 
 
A smaller group of 3 actuaries adopts exactly the opposite position. They do not 
support a portfolio level but the fully consideration of the effects of diversification. 
                                                        
 
114 CL 97, p. 23. 
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These actuaries think that an exclusion of these effects “would not reflect economic 
reality”115. 
 
3 actuaries answer to this question only partly agreeing with the board’s views. All of 
them generally agree with the use of a portfolio basis for determining risk margins. 1 
disagrees with the given definition of a portfolio. This commenter agrees with the 
board’s view not to include the diversification benefits between portfolios. The other 2 
think they should be reflected in the risk margins. 
 
3.3.4. Accounting profession 
21 out of 28 representatives of the group of accounting profession answer to this 
question. Only 1 commenter is against the determination of risk margins on a 
portfolio level. He thinks that the board’s arguments in the DP are “insufficient to 
support a conclusion on the appropriate unit of measurement”116. This commenter 
gives no further comments on the second part of the question. Within the 20 
supporters of the portfolio level half of the commenters think that the given definition 
of a portfolio in IFRS 4 is appropriate. Their main arguments in favour of a portfolio 
basis are: 
‐ It reflects the core issue of the insurance business which is the pooling of 
risks. 
‐ Insurers manage their business on a portfolio basis. The unit of account for 
risk margins should be the same as for management purposes. 
 
Some opponents of the IFRS 4 definition of portfolios dislike the term of “broadly 
similar risks”. They require further guidance on that because this term may be 
interpreted differently in practice.  
 
The views on the second part of the question are balanced. Out of 20 commenters 
replying on this topic, 9 agree with the board’s view that the benefits of diversification 
and negative correlation between portfolios should not be reflected in the risk 
margins. Only a few give concrete reasons for this opinion. Some argue that it is 
                                                        
 
115 CL 13, p. 10. 
116 CL 92, p. A-10. 
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more appropriate to show these effects in another way, e.g. through suitable 
disclosure or capital requirements. Another argument is that not reflecting the 
benefits of diversification creates consistency with the measurement criteria under 
IAS 39 and the portfolio basis as unit of account for risk margins.  
 
However, 11 commenters do not share this view. Most of them mention that 
considering the effects of diversification benefits “is a key part of both management 
and pricing policies of an insurer”117 and should be taken into account to reflect this 
fact. Some commenters prefer entity-level based information in the financial 
statements and hence would include all benefits from diversification including those 
between portfolios. 
 
3.3.5. Standard setters 
Except 1 standard setter all representatives of this group answer to question 11. The 
17 commenters that refer to the first part of the question share the board’s opinion to 
use the portfolio as the unit of account for risk margins. The arguments stated in the 
DP are favoured. But again the suggested definition of a portfolio is seen 
controversial. Only 7 standard setters concretely agree with the IFRS 4 definition. In 
contrast 10 commenters request the board to change the existing definition. 
Arguments against this definition are that the terms “contracts” and “broadly similar 
risks” may be problematic and “may not necessarily reflect the way in which insurers 
manage their contracts”118. 
 
The 15 standard setters that reply to the second part of the question can again be 
divided into 2 groups. 8 commenters support the board’s view and think that risk 
margins should not reflect the benefits of diversifications and negative correlation 
between portfolios. The 7 standard setters that support consideration of these 
benefits mention amongst others the following arguments for this position: 
‐ An accounting model should reflect these benefits as they are an integral part 
of an insurer’s business model.119 
                                                        
 
117 CL 60, p. 8. 
118 CL 132, p. 9. 
119 cf. CL 141, p. 18 
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‐ “Large insurance groups are also supposed to include their scale (including 
diversification) benefits in their pricing. If they cannot be reflected in the 
measurement of insurance contracts, a loss at inception will be measured that 
is not an economic loss.”120 
 
3.3.6. Supervisors 
To the group of supervisors this question seems to be not that much relevant as only 
3 out of 7 answer to it. 2 of them agree with the board’s view on both parts of the 
question. This means they support determining risk margins for a portfolio defined as 
in IFRS 4. Diversification benefits and negative correlations between portfolios 
should not be reflected. 1 supervisor supports the opposite position in all of these 
matters. He prefers a higher level of aggregation. 
 
3.3.7. Financial service providers 
Only 11 out of 21 financial service providers comment on this question. 10 of them 
answer to the first part of the question. Like within the group of supervisors only 1 
commenter disagrees with the board’s views in all aspects. The main argument of the 
9 financial service providers supporting a portfolio as the unit of account is the 
following: Insurers manage their business by pooling of risks and the law of large 
numbers. This reality is reflected by determining risk margins on a portfolio-level. 
Most of the commenters also agree with the definition given in IFRS 4.  
 
The answers to the second part of the question are again controversial. 4 
commenters support the board’s view and do not want risk margins to reflect the 
benefits of diversification and negative correlation between portfolios. 1 of these 
commenters gives a short but very catchy argument for this position: “If one accepts 
the logic of (a) then the answer must be no.”121 It means that if risks are managed 
within a portfolio, reflecting effects of higher levels of aggregation cannot be allowed. 
However, there are 7 financial service providers wishing diversification benefits to be 
included.  
 
                                                        
 
120 CL 191, p. 12. 
121 CL 2, p. 6. 
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3.3.8. Others 
Amongst other commenters only 7 answer at least to parts of question 11. Only 2 
commenters are against a portfolio as unit of account for risk margins. An argument 
stated by the other 5 commenters supporting a portfolio level is that the risk margin 
calculation should be done at the same level as the management uses for the 
pooling of risks. The definition of a portfolio is rarely commented.  
 
Arguing whether risk margins should reflect diversification benefits, there is a tie. A 
small group of 3 commenters agrees respectively disagree with the board’s view. The 
argument used in favour of reflecting diversification benefits is that these benefits 
actually exist and hence need to be recognised in an appropriate accounting system.  
 
3.3.9. Summary 
According to the first part of the question the majority of all groups favours a portfolio 
as the unit of account. Opponents of this view mostly prefer a higher level of 
aggregation. But when defining a portfolio there are different views even amongst 
supporters of the portfolio level. Especially the term “broadly similar risks” is not 
appropriate enough for some commenters. However, a big part of the commenters is 
satisfied with the existing definition.  
 
There is a keen discussion whether to recognise all diversification benefits or not. It 
cannot be said that the view on the first part of the question automatically leads to a 
specific view on the matter of the second part. Both, proponents and opponents of a 
portfolio-level argue partly in the same way. The most popular argument for reflecting 
diversification benefits is that in fact insurers use these effects when pricing and 
managing their contracts and hence should be recognised to reflect how the 
business works. A common argument of the opposite side is that including 
diversifications benefits between portfolios would lead to measurement on an entity-
level, which is not desirable. Some commenters suggest that the board should grant 
insurers another possibility to recognise diversification benefits. A possibility could be 
to include appropriate disclosures in the financial statements. 
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3.4. The commenters’ views on measuring reinsurance assets 
at current exit value 
3.4.1. Question 12 
(a)  Should a cedant measure reinsurance assets at current exit value? Why or why 
not? 
(b)  Do you agree that the consequences of measuring reinsurance assets at 
current exit value include the following? Why or why not? 
 (i)  A risk margin typically increases the measurement of the reinsurance 
asset, and equals the risk margin for the corresponding part of the 
underlying insurance contract. 
 (ii)  An expected loss model would be used for defaults and disputes, not the 
incurred loss model required by IFRS 4 and IAS 39. 
 (iii) If the cedant has a contractual right to obtain reinsurance for contracts that 
it has not yet issued, the current exit value of the cedant’s reinsurance 
asset includes the current exit value of that right. However, the current exit 
value of that contractual right is not likely to be material if it relates to 
insurance contracts that will be priced at current exit value. 
 
3.4.2. Insurers 
In this group 31 out of 55 commenters reply to this question. Not all of them 
commented on both parts of the question. From the 30 commenters that replied to 
part (a) of the question there are 16 agreeing and 14 disagreeing with the board’s 
view to measure reinsurance assets at CEV. It is interesting that all of them share the 
same thought that it is essential to measure reinsurance assets on the same basis as 
the related liabilities. This consistency should avoid accounting mismatches. As the 
suggested measurement for insurance liabilities in the DP is the CEV, it is 
understood that proponents of this approach agree with the board’s view. The 
problem is that about half of the insurers do not support the CEV approach at all. A 
few argue that the CEV is no useful measurement basis “since there is no ability to 
verify and calibrate reinsurer estimates in the absence of an observable transfer 
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market”122. However, the insurers’ views on that are quite heterogeneous and there is 
no dominating tendency.  
 
The second part of the question presents 3 consequences the board identified when 
measuring reinsurance assets at CEV. This question can be answered independently 
of whether a commenter supports the CEV approach in general or not. This is why 
some opponents of the CEV nevertheless agree with the board’s view on part (b) of 
the question.  
 
The views on the first 2 statements are quite homogenous. There is no insurer 
disagreeing in all cases with the conclusion made under the first sub-item. All of the 
20 insurers that commented on that agree that the risk margin would increase the 
measurement of the reinsurance asset. But 4 of them mention that the risk margin 
would not necessarily equal the risk margin for the corresponding part of the 
underlying insurance contract. A stated reason for this view is that there may be 
“economic differences between risks assumed and ceded”123. 
 
Only 2 insurers disagree with the exceptional use of the expected loss model for 
defaults and disputes within reinsurance contracts. They mention the inconsistency 
with other IFRSs and hence support the incurred loss model. 20 insurers think that 
the expected loss model is appropriate and consistent with the CEV model. 
 
The views on the third discussed conclusion are not so homogenous. Regardless of 
whether a commenter agrees with the CEV approach in general or not, about half of 
the 20 comments are against the board’s view that potential contractual rights build 
an asset that should be included in the measurement of the cedant’s reinsurance 
asset. Again, 2 groups can be identified: those in favour of including such future 
options into the valuation, and those against. But all insurers agree on the fact that 
these rights would not be material anyway. This is why 1 insurer even questions the 
need to recognise such contractual rights at all.124 
 
                                                        
 
122 CL 59, p. 11. 
123 CL 127, p. 12; CL 117, p. 14. 
124 cf. CL 17, p. 4. 
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3.4.3. Actuaries 
In this group there are only 9 commenters that comment on this question. Similar to 
the group of insurers, actuaries agree on the need to measure (re)insurance assets 
consistently with the corresponding insurance contracts. There are 3 actuaries not 
agreeing with the CEV approach generally. This is why they do not want reinsurance 
assets to be measured on that basis. The Austrian Actuarial Association thinks that 
the CEV is just a price. Unique prices in incomplete markets are not possible. 
Instead, a concept of a value based on actuarial principles and reflecting the role of 
the portfolio within the insurance company should be introduced.125 This is why an 
“actuarial value”-concept should be used for direct insurance as well as for indirect 
insurance.126 
 
Nevertheless, all except 2 comments agree on both consequences quoted under (i) 
and (ii) of part (b) of the question. 1 actuary thinks that the risk margin of reinsurance 
assets does not always equal the risk margin for the corresponding part of the 
underlying insurance contract. Another actuary thinks that the existing incurred loss 
model is more appropriate than the expected loss model. 
 
5 out of 8 commenters share the board’s view on contractual rights in conjunction 
with reinsurance contracts. 2 of the 3 actuaries that do not wish such rights to be 
recognised in the valuation of reinsurance assets stated as reason the following 4 
scenarios resulting in not recognising such rights as the better solution: 
- “The underlying business is expected to be profitable and parts of the 
expected profit will be shared with the reinsurer, i.e., the future new business 
will reduce the reinsurance asset but that is contingent that first the direct 
insurer has higher initial gains from future business. There is no need to 
anticipate the potential reduction of the reinsurance asset if conditioned by 
future (higher) gains. Such reductions should not be recognized in advance.  
- The underlying business is expected to be unprofitable and parts of the 
expected loss will be shared with the reinsurer, i.e., the future new business 
will increase the reinsurance asset, but that is contingent on the direct insurer 
                                                        
 
125 cf. CL 74, p. 7. 
126 cf. CL 74, p. 10. 
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having initial losses from future business. It should not be anticipated that the 
in-surer will write loss-making business.  
- The underlying business is expected to be unprofitable and in combination 
with the reinsurance contract a total expected loss will be even higher. That 
would result in a reduction of the reinsurance asset. However, it should not be 
anticipated that the insurer will write loss-making business in the future.  
- The underlying business is expected to be profitable and in combination the 
re-insurance contract a total expected profit will be even higher. However, it 
should not be anticipated, that the insurer is able to write contracts with an 
initial gain under a current exit value measurement.” 127 
 
Because a reinsurance contract can only exist in relation to the underlying insurance 
contracts, it should be measured with reference to the direct insurance liability. Only 
contracts that are already issued should be taken into consideration.128 These 2 
commenters also do not support the CEV approach as presented in the DP. 
 
3.4.4. Accounting profession 
The response to this question is quite substantial. 20 out of 28 representatives of 
accounting profession comment on question 12; whereof 19 respond to part (a). 11 of 
them agree to the CEV as measurement method for reinsurance assets. Their main 
argument is that direct and indirect insurance contracts should be measured in the 
same way. As the board proposes the CEV for direct insurance contracts, it is 
consistent to use this approach also for the reinsurance assets.  
 
Most of the 8 disagreeing commenters suggest other settlement values instead of the 
proposed CEV. A common problem seems to be the terminology and in conjunction 
with that the understanding of how the CEV should be determined. Although some 
commenters support the approaches of the three building blocks, they do not agree 
with the board’s conclusion on the definition of the CEV. Some argue that the 
labelling of the suggested measurement method is not suitable. 
 
                                                        
 
127 CL 97, p. 27 – 28; CL 54, p. 41. 
128 cf. CL 97, p. 28; CL 54, p. 41. 
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Concerning part (b) of the question the major part of the commenters agrees with the 
consequences of the CEV approach the board identified. These agreements are 
made under the assumption that the board decides to enforce the CEV as 
measurement basis. This does not mean that all commenters that agree to the 
identified consequences of the CEV also agree with the CEV concept in general. 14 
commenters think that the risk margin under the CEV approach would increase the 
CEV of the reinsurance asset. 11 of them also think that this risk margin would equal 
the risk margin of the underlying insurance contract. 1 of the 2 commenters totally 
disagreeing with the board’s view on the first consequence states that they “do not 
support the principle of raising a risk margin”129. 
 
15 commenters agree that the expected loss model would be more appropriate under 
the CEV approach. Only 2 wish to stick to the incurred loss model. 1 commenter 
does not support either of both models. Instead they favour a measurement model 
“that is built on an expected future cash flow approach as for insurance contracts in 
general”130 when defaults or disputes are occurring. 
 
Concerning the third sub-item 12 commenters agree with the board’s view. Those 4 
that disagree mention different kinds of concerns: 
- 1 commenter preferring a settlement value approach argues that the problem 
with contractual rights will not occur when using this approach.131 
- 1 commenter thinks the value of the contractual right could be material if there 
have been changes since entering the contract.132 
- 1 commenter does not wish to include future business into the CEV. It is also 
mentioned that they are not sure what the board’s intention of this question 
was and ask for clarification.133 
- 1 commenter argues that such contractual rights only exist legally without the 
underlying insurance contracts not issued yet. Hence the value would be 
zero.134 
                                                        
 
129 CL 29, p. 6. 
130 CL 133, p. 8. 
131 cf. CL 29, p. 6. 
132 cf. CL 28, p. 5. 
133 cf. CL 12, p. 5. 
134 cf. CL 116, p. 11. 
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3.4.5. Standard setters 
Although 15 out of 19 standard setters answer to this question, only 14 are 
considered for the analysis because 1 standard setter just comments on how to 
calculate risk margins in general and stated characteristics of its national insurance 
market.135 These comments do not refer specifically enough to the question. 
 
Most supervisors agree on measuring reinsurance assets at CEV. 5 do not 
necessarily support the CEV at all. All of those who decided to comment on the 
second part of the question too agree with the first conclusion under sub-item (i) of 
part (b). 2 commenters noted that the risk margins may not always be equal. 
Concerning the second sub-item 8 commenters agree and only 2 disagree on the 
assignment of the expected loss model. 1 commenter states a very interesting 
observation in practice: users told this standard setter that “a sufficient empirical 
basis for a reliable measurement of that probability is not available. Furthermore, in 
practice the probability for reinsurers to default is very low.”136 This is why these 
users retained the incurred loss model. 
 
When it comes to the third sub-item the standard setters have inhomogeneous views. 
5 commenters think that contractual rights to obtain reinsurance for contracts that 
have not been issued yet should be reflected in the valuation of the asset and 5 think 
they should not. Both sides replicate the corresponding reasons the board already 
stated in the DP. 
 
3.4.6. Supervisors 
“Supervisors” is a small group, hence only 3 comment directly on question 12. 2 of 
them agree to all of the board’s assumptions. The 1 commenter disagreeing with the 
CEV approach did not comment on the second part of the question. The others do 
not state extensive reasons to support their views, but note some additional thoughts. 
An example affecting the risk margin is: “In practice, insurance undertaking may find 
                                                        
 
135 cf. CL 73, p. 10 – 11. 
136 CL 119, p. 18. 
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it easier to measure the risk margins of a liability net of reinsurance, which would 
result in a net risk margin on the liability side and no risk margin on the asset side.”137 
 
3.4.7. Financial service providers 
Out of 21 financial service providers, 11 comment on part (a) of the question. 9 of 
them also comment on part (b) of the question. On the first part the comments are 
similar to them of the other groups. Most commenters agree with the CEV approach 
for reinsurance assets because they support consistency in the measuring of 
reinsurance assets and the related contracts. 3 disagree with the CEV approach. 
 
8 commenters confirm the firstly stated consequence of the CEV approach that a risk 
margin typically increases the measurement of the reinsurance asset and equals the 
risk margin for the corresponding part of the underlying insurance contract. Only 1 
mentions that “for non-proportional reinsurance and stop loss covers, the risk margin 
on the underlying direct insurance would not necessarily be equal to the risk margin 
on the reinsured risk exposures”138. 
 
Again, 8 commenters agree with the use of an expected loss model stated under 
sub-item (ii) because it is consistent with the CEV. Some mention that they are aware 
that this would be inconsistent with required IFRS 4 and IAS 39. 1 even suggests that 
the approach in IAS 39 should be changed, as part of a move towards the adoption 
of the fair value more generally.139 Only 1 commenter insists on the incurred loss 
model. 
 
6 commenters share the board’s view on the sub-item (iii) about contractual rights. 
Although some mention concerns and note that this would not be material, they 
agree that reflecting these rights in the measurement is consistent with the CEV 
approach. There are 2 financial service providers who do not share this view.  
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3.4.8. Others 
The answers of the 7 other commenters that reply to the question are varying a lot. 
There are 4 commenters supporting the CEV and 3 who do not. 2 of the opponents 
suggest other measurement bases: the liquidation value and the settlement value. 
 
3 commenters support the board’s view on the first consequence of the CEV 
mentioned under sub-item (i) of part (b) of the question. 2 disagree to that. 1 of them 
does not think the risk margins would be equal. The other commenter suggests that 
“the risk margin component should be accounted for in equity”140. There are 3 
commenters supporting the expected loss model and 1 supporting the incurred loss 
model. All of the 4 commenters that state their view on the last conclusion about 
contractual rights, stated under part (b) sub-item (iii) of the question, do not agree 
with the board’s view. They think such rights should not be recognised as they do not 
qualify as an asset at all. 
 
3.4.9. Summary 
All in all again there is a big discussion about the CEV in general. A slightly higher 
number of commenters agrees with the CEV approach and logically also wish 
reinsurance assets to be measured on this basis. But a remarkable part of the 
commenters mentions critics on the presented CEV approach. However, it can be 
said that all commenters support consistency in measuring liabilities and assets 
respectively in measuring reinsurance assets and the related contracts. 
 
The board defines 3 consequences when measuring at CEV. While a lot of 
commenters agree with the first 2, there are a few arguments against the third 
consequence. Not all commenters think that a contractual right to obtain reinsurance 
for contracts that have not been issued yet qualifies as an asset. Beside this, it may 
be of no importance whether these rights are recognised or not as most commenters 
think such rights would not be material anyway. 
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3.5. The commenters’ views on unbundling of deposit or 
service components 
3.5.1. Question 13 
If an insurance contract contains deposit or service components, should an insurer 
unbundle them? Why or why not? 
 
3.5.2. Insurers 
There are 31 insurers that comment on unbundling of insurance contract 
components. A certain tendency amongst insurers can be identified: two thirds (in 
total 21) do not agree with the idea of unbundling at all. All of them mention at least 1 
of the following 3 core arguments that support this view: 
‐ The insurance contract should be treated as a whole because some 
components “would typically not be found as standalone transactions in the 
marketplace”141. So these components do only exist theoretically. Hence, 
Unbundling would be “inconsistent with the way most insurance products are 
designed, priced and managed”142.This is why unbundling would not provide 
useful information for financial statement users. 
‐ Identifying and separating the contract components could be subjectively or 
arbitrary. This would lead to less comparability between the financial 
statements of different insurers. 
‐ Unbundling is a complex undertaking that costs time and money because 
insurers may have to change systems and have to evaluate their contracts. 
The costs would outweigh the benefits that could be achieved by unbundling. 
 
However, there are still 10 insurers that would generally support unbundling of 
insurance components. None of them fully agrees with the treatment of deposit 
components the board proposes in the DP. They agree that unbundling is essential 
when the deposit components are not interdependent to the insurance components. 
But the board also proposes that if the components are interdependent but can be 
measured separately some kind of unbundling should be done. The board suggests 
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in this case to measure the whole contract under the phase II standard and to deduct 
the measurement of the deposit component under IAS 39. Most insurers think that 
the value of the insurance component that is created this way is not appropriate 
because there are “inconsistencies between the two IFRS models”143. The phase II 
standard proposes some kind of a fair value approach. For the component measured 
under IAS 39 the fair value option may not apply. 
 
3.5.3. Actuaries 
10 out of 14 actuaries reply to this question. Only 1 commenter agrees with the 
concept of unbundling as a whole and states the reason that it is consistent with the 
IASB framework. All other actuaries do not support unbundling either as proposed in 
the DP or even at all. The 3 commenters totally disapproving unbundling think that it 
does not provide a lot of additional useful information for the users of the financial 
statements. They say unbundling is complex and costs more than it brings in return. 
 
Most actuaries do not oppose unbundling in principle, but do suggest other solutions. 
Instead of discussing unbundling, “inconsistencies in the valuation of insurance 
contracts, investment contracts and service contracts should be eliminated”144. This 
would lead to the same measurement of all components. Hence, there would be no 
difference whether the components are measured separately or as a whole contract 
and therefore would make the question of unbundling invalid. Some commenters 
acknowledge that if the board however insists on unbundling, it would only be 
appropriate if the components are not interdependent. 
 
3.5.4. Accounting profession 
Compared to the groups above there are quite a lot of commenters amongst the 
group of accounting profession generally agreeing with the idea of unbundling. Out of 
20 replies to this question, 9 do not completely oppose unbundling. But these 
commenters still mentioned some concerns or limitations. They think that unbundling 
should not be mandatory or only be done “if there is a clear split of the 
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components”145 and “a reliable measurement of the value of the contract attributable 
to each of the components can be made”146. Some only support unbundling of 
service components. 
 
A small majority of 11 commenters do not think insurance contracts should be 
unbundled. Amongst other things, they argue that it would cost too much to 
implement unbundling and that it may not provide more relevant and reliable 
information. Some argue that “each insurance contract should be viewed as a 
whole”147 as service and deposit components are not managed as separate 
elements. Another often criticised matter is a lack of sufficient definition of some 
terms. The commenters require more clarification of the terms “arbitrary”, 
“interdependent” and “deposit”.  
 
Regardless of whether the commenter supports unbundling or not, 6 commenters 
additionally mentioned that the board’s suggestion of how to measure the 
components if they are interdependent but can be measured separately on a non-
arbitrary basis is not appropriate. The amount resulting out of subtracting of the 
measurement deposit component under IAS 39 from the measurement of the whole 
contract under the phase II standard “would be meaningless to the users”148 as the 
fair value option under IAS 39 may not necessarily apply. 
 
3.5.5. Standard setters 
All except 1 of the 19 standard setters answer to question 13. The majority of 13 of 
them generally agrees with the concept and basic idea of unbundling. Nevertheless, 
they mention some concerns. First, most only support unbundling if the components 
of an insurance contract are not interdependent and can be separated on a non-
arbitrary basis. In conjunction with that, some especially criticise the board’s 
suggested treatment if the components are interdependent but can be measured on 
a basis that is not arbitrary. In this case the board thinks the insurance component 
should be measured as the difference between the measurement of the whole 
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contract and the measurement of the deposit contract. Some commenters think that 
this would not result in a meaningful value of the insurance component. 1 commenter 
only agrees “if the measurement of the deposit feature under IAS 39 is changed”149, 
preferring the expected value. 
 
The 5 commenters disagreeing with unbundling each name a different reasons for 
this view: 
- The contract should be measured as a whole in order to take all its 
characteristics into account.150 
- Problems that occur practically including such as that costs would outweigh 
the benefits of unbundling. 151 
- The portfolio should be used as unit of account and therefore the treatment of 
the portfolio should be consistent with the range of types that it contains.152 
- If the accounting for the components is done separately it will not reflect the 
substance of the transaction.153 
 
There is 1 standard setter who would agree on unbundling for presentation purposes 
but not for measurement purposes. This commenter would actually prefer to 
eliminate the need to unbundle for measurement purposes, i.e. there should be no 
different measurement models.154 
 
3.5.6. Supervisors 
Supervisors seem to have a different view on unbundling as most of the other groups 
of commenters. This is the only group where all of the 5 comments on this matter 
tend towards a positive opinion about unbundling. 3 supervisors generally agree on 
the suggested approach in the DP except for the case that components are 
interdependent but can be measured separately on a basis that is not arbitrary. 
Similar to a lot of commenters in the other groups they think that the value resulting 
from the suggested treatment leads to an “inconsistent valuation of the insurance 
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component”155 and hence would not provide meaningful information. The other 2 
commenters would agree on unbundling in theory, but state practical concerns.  
 
3.5.7. Financial service providers 
Half of the 12 financial service providers that reply to this question would agree on 
unbundling but only under certain circumstances. These commenters think that in 
practice unbundling may complicate the accounting model and may be difficult to 
implement. This is why they require that unbundling should only be done if the 
components are not interdependent and if a separate measurement can be done 
easily. 1 commenter thinks that appropriate disclosures “may be a better way to help 
us understand the dynamics of more complex insurance contracts”156. Additionally, 
some mention that unbundling should only be done if its costs do not outweigh the 
additional benefit respectively the additional information for the users of the financial 
statements. 
 
The other half does not agree to unbundle an insurance contract’s components. They 
prefer the contract to be measured as a whole. Their main argument for that is that 
all components are so interdependent “that it is very difficult to bifurcate and measure 
the components separately”157. Furthermore, unbundling would create additional 
costs and would not provide reliable and relevant information to the users of the 
financial statements. Like within the groups of actuaries and standard setters, 1 
financial service provider wishes the inconsistencies of valuation between the 
different kinds of contracts to be eliminated. This would make the question of 
unbundling obsolete. 
 
3.5.8. Others 
Only 6 out of 18 representatives of this group give their opinion on unbundling. 3 of 
them agree on unbundling as far as the service and deposit components are 
independent from the insurance component and can be evaluated. They do not 
comment specifically on the board’s proposals on how to conduct unbundling. 
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The other 3 commenters disagree on unbundling. A reason for this view is that there 
is always some kind of interdependency between the components and therefore no 
reliable measurement can be done. As insurance contracts are generally prices on a 
combined basis, splitting the contract could be subjective. Hence, unbundling would 
not provide additional useful information for the users of the financial statements. 
 
3.5.9. Summary 
While the groups of insurers, actuaries and accounting profession tend to not support 
unbundling, the groups of standard setters and supervisors provide a large number of 
commenters agreeing with unbundling. Amongst supervisors even all commenters 
agree. The views within the groups of financial service providers and others are 
balanced. 
 
Those disagreeing with unbundling basically name the 3 reasons identified in the 
group of insurers to support their view: The insurance contract should be treated as a 
whole because the components only exist theoretically. Identifying and separating 
the contract components could be subjective or arbitrary. The costs of unbundling 
would outweigh the benefits. 
 
Proponents of unbundling mostly still have some concerns and would restrict 
unbundling on contracts where the components are independent and easy to 
evaluate. Especially the board’s view on unbundling components that are 
interdependent but can be measured separately on a basis that is not arbitrary is 
criticised quite often. 
 
3.6. The commenters’ views on credit characteristics of an 
insurance liability 
3.6.1. Question 14 
(a)  Is the current exit value of a liability the price for a transfer that neither improves 
nor impairs its credit characteristics? Why or why not? 
(b)  Should the measurement of an insurance liability reflect (i) its credit 
characteristics at inception and (ii) subsequent changes in their effect? Why or 
why not? 
 63 
3.6.2. Insurers 
This is the question with the highest number of replies amongst this group. 35 out of 
55 insurers give an opinion on this matter. Most of them only answer specifically to 
part (b) of the question, i.e. whether the measurement of an insurance liability should 
reflect its credit characteristics. This is maybe because some commenters already 
mentioned concerns about the CEV approach in general in conjunction with other 
questions in the first half.  
 
There are only 2 commenters that answer both parts of the question in the affirmative 
and hence agree on the board’s views on this matter. 2 more commenters agree that 
the CEV of a liability by definition would be the price for a transfer that neither 
improves nor impairs its credit characteristics. But these 2 commenters do not agree 
with the CEV approach in general. Another 8 commenters do not agree on the 
definition in part (a). They either do not support the CEV at all or mention that there 
may be transactions that could improve the credit characteristics of the liability. 
 
Part (b) is the more important part of the question. There is a clear tendency against 
reflecting the credit characteristics in the measurement of an insurance liability as 33 
commenters disagree on doing so. More than half of them mention at least 1 of the 
following 2 reasons to support this view: 
- If the measurement of an insurance liability reflects its credit characteristics, it 
would lead to counterintuitive accounting. This is because “an insurer whose 
credit rating is downgraded would report an accounting gain”158. 
- This kind of measurement provides no decision useful information for the 
users of the financial statements and even may be misleading. 
 
Another 2 reasons that are mentioned quite often are: 
- “An entity prepares its financial statements on the going concern basis and 
therefore with the full intention of meeting its insurance liability obligations.”159 
An insurer would not be able to realize the hypothetical gains accounted as 
long as the going concern principle applies. 
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- In most jurisdictions exists some kind of guarantee fund that would meet 
policyholders’ obligations in the case of bankruptcy of the insurer. This is why 
the credit characteristics are not relevant for measurement issues. 
 
3.6.3. Actuaries 
8 out of 14 actuaries decide to answer to this question. There is only 1 commenter 
agreeing with the board’s views. He argues that a “current portfolio exit value 
approach is intended to consider the probability weighted average of all scenarios, 
including those where the contractual cash flows do not occur. [...] However, we 
agree that a rational transferee would not willingly pay for a credit upgrade, and 
similarly, rational creditors (policyholders) would not generally permit a transfer that 
would reduce their rights (assuming creditors have a right to influence the transfer in 
the particular jurisdiction).”160 This is why the commenter agrees with the board’s 
determination of the CEV. He also agrees on reflecting the liability’s credit 
characteristics in its measurement, because the measurement of debt issues for 
cash should reflect them and there is no reason to treat insurance liabilities in a 
different way. 
 
However, the clear majority of 7 commenters is disagreeing with these views. Most of 
them argue that credit characteristics might not be material or of limited relevance 
and therefore there is no need to include them in the measurement of insurance 
liabilities. 1 commenter even thinks that there cannot be identified any credit risk for 
the insurer at all. The only party facing credit risk is the policyholder and that is not 
within the scope of the DP.161 
 
Another commenter would only agree “to the extent that market participants reflect 
the credit characteristics of the contract [...]. Where they are not reflected, i.e. where 
measurement is determined on a market-to-model basis, such an approach is not 
appropriate.”162 
 
                                                        
 
160 CL 30, p. 13. 
161 cf. CL 74, p. 10. 
162 CL 97, p. 31. 
 65 
3.6.4. Accounting profession 
In this group 22 out of 28 commenters reply to this question. 16 of them deal with 
part a) and 27 with part b) of the question. To the first part of the question whether 
the CEV of a liability is the price for a transfer that neither improves nor impairs its 
credit characteristics, 14 commenters answer in the affirmative. But most of them 
also mention that they do not support the CEV approach in general. They just 
acknowledge that this conclusion is consistent with the CEV if the board decides to 
adopt the measurement model as proposed in the DP. There is just 1 commenter 
who does not agree with the board’s view at all.  
 
Although so many commenters agree on part a) of the question, only 4 agree with 
the board’s view that the measurement at CEV should reflect the liability’s credit 
characteristics at inception and the subsequent changes in their effect. 1 commenter 
agrees on reflecting these characteristics but proposes a model that “differs in some 
key respects from an exit value model”163. 
 
3 commenters would agree on reflecting the credit characteristics at inception, but 
not for subsequent changes. On initial measurement it would be appropriate because 
these would also be included in the premium charged under the contract. But the 
majority of 13 commenters disagrees on reflecting credit characteristics in the 
measurement of an insurance liability at all. They mainly name the same arguments 
like the group of insurers. The results of the proposed accounting are counterintuitive 
because they do not think that “a decline in creditworthiness should result in the 
recognition of a gain”164. Furthermore, such changes do not provide relevant 
information to the users of the financial statements. 1 commenter just states on both 
parts of the question that this would not be relevant under a settlement value 
approach. 
 
3.6.5. Standard setters 
18 out of 19 standard setters answer to this question. Some of them only refer to part 
b) of the question. 1 of them just states that the definition of “credit characteristics” 
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given in the DP is too vague, so he cannot really comment on this matter. This 
comment is not taken into consideration any further.  
 
The narrow majority (8 commenters) of those referring to part a) as well disagrees 
with the board’s view. They either do not support the CEV approach at all or 
generally think that the measurement should not reflect changes in the entity’s 
creditworthiness. Anyhow, there are still 6 commenters who think that the board’s 
view is correct. 1 of them admits that he only agrees conceptually and the board’s 
assumptions will not always be true in practice. 
 
There are only 6 standard setters who agree with the board’s view on the second 
part of the question. Only 2 of them mention a concrete reason: The measurement 
basis should be the same as for financial instruments in IAS 39. 1 commenter would 
agree on reflecting the credit characteristics at inception, but not for subsequent 
changes. However, the majority of 11 standard setters disagrees with the board’s 
view. The reason that almost all of them mention is that reflecting the 
creditworthiness in measurement of an insurance liability provides no useful 
information to the users of the financial statements. 
 
3.6.6. Supervisors 
In this group are 7 supervisors of which 4 answer to the question. Only 1 of them 
agrees with the board’s view and hence affirms both parts of the question. He bases 
this view on the belief that this kind of measurement “includes all scenarios in which 
some or all contractual cash flows do not occur which is consistent with 
measurements based on expected values”165. 
 
The remaining 3 commenters do not agree with the board’s view. They all conclude 
that credit characteristics generally should not be reflected in the measurement of 
insurance liabilities as this would not provide relevant information to the users of the 
financial statements and is inconsistent with the going concern principle. It is 
interesting that 1 of them also thinks that this would not be consistent with the CEV 
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measurement. This is the same argument, as given above, the only proponent uses 
but for supporting the opposite view. 
 
3.6.7. Financial service providers 
In this group 11 out of 21 financial service providers refer to this question. Only 8 
commenters answer directly on the first part of the question. Half of them agree with 
the board’s view that the CEV of a liability is the price for a transfer that neither 
improves nor impairs its credit characteristics. The other half disagrees because they 
think the CEV is “not observable in an active market”166 or they prefer another 
measurement basis, e.g. settlement value. 
 
There is only 1 commenter who agrees with the board’s view on the second part of 
the question. Another commenter agrees on reflecting the credit characteristics only 
at inception. But including subsequent changes of the credit characteristics in the 
measurement would “misrepresent the performance”167. The remaining 9 financial 
service providers do not think that credit characteristics should be reflected. Beside 
those that generally prefer other measurement methods than the CEV, some argue 
that reflecting the credit characteristics of an insurance liability leads to inappropriate 
accounting. Recognising gains because an insurer’s creditworthiness is deteriorating 
is counterintuitive and does not provide helpful information to the users of the 
financial statements. 
 
3.6.8. Others 
The 7 out of 18 commenters in this group answering to the question rather disagree 
with the board’s view. Concerning the first part of the question 1 commenter agrees 
that the CEV of a liability is the price for a transfer that neither improves nor impairs 
its credit characteristics, but he considers the model inappropriate for insurance 
liabilities.  
 
All of the 7 commenters would not reflect the credit characteristics in the 
measurement of an insurance liability at all. They state different reasons like, “it 
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would be inconsistent with the IASB framework”168, it would not be significant and it 
results in an inadequate accounting system. 1 commenter rejects the board’s 
proposal as he states: “The suggested approach is confusing and dangerous to 
unsophisticated users.”169 
 
3.6.9. Summary 
Among all groups there is a tendency towards not agreeing with the board’s view and 
preferring not to reflect the credit characteristics of a liability in its measurement. The 
strongest arguments in favour of this are that it does not provide useful information to 
the users of the financial statements and that the resulting accounting is 
counterintuitive.  
 
A lot of commenters also criticize the CEV approach in general and prefer other 
measurement methods. But a lot of commenters that do not agree with the CEV in 
general admit that if the board decides to use the CEV approach as proposed in the 
DP, it would be conceptually correct that the CEV of a liability is the price for a 
transfer that neither improves nor impairs its credit characteristics. So beside 
practical considerations that do not support the board’s view, like the mentioned 
above, the general problem of acceptance of the CEV approach arises again. 
 
3.7. The commenters’ views on conflicting treatment between 
insurance liabilities and financial liabilities (IAS 39) 
3.7.1. Question 15 
Appendix B identifies some inconsistencies between the proposed treatment of 
insurance liabilities and the existing treatment under IAS 39 of financial liabilities. 
Should the Board consider changing the treatment of some or all financial liabilities to 
avoid those inconsistencies? If so, what changes should the Board consider, and 
why? 
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3.7.2. Insurers 
Only 25 out of 55 insurers answer to this question. 9 commenters just mention that 
this is not the right place to discuss this matter. They recommend that a working 
group should review the IAS 39 and say that comments will be given later on the DP 
for financial instruments.  
 
8 commenters do agree with the board’s view and wish consistency between the 
standards. 3 of them admit that there are some areas where it will not be possible to 
achieve consistency. An example is “the option within IAS 39 to use amortised cost 
for financial liabilities, whereas the DP proposes that all insurance liabilities would be 
measured on a current value basis”170. Only a few commenters give concrete 
suggestions what should be changed to create consistency, but most of them concur 
that the treatment of financial liabilities under IAS 39 should follow the treatment of 
insurance liabilities. 
 
There are 8 insurers that disagree with the board’s view and think that the standards 
need not to be harmonized. Their main argument is: “Insurance liabilities have 
different features to other financial liabilities and therefore these inconsistencies are 
appropriate.”171  
 
3.7.3. Actuaries 
7 out of 14 actuaries comment on this question. The clear majority of 6 of them 
agrees with the board’s view that consistency should be achieved generally. While 
most support an alignment of IAS 39 to the new standard for insurance contracts, 1 
commenter mentions an inconsistency, which is allowing gains at inception, that 
“should be addressed by changing the proposes insurance accounting standard and 
not by changing IAS 39”172. 2 actuaries give additional feedback on the following 
factors that differ between the standards: initial measurement, gain at inception, 
subsequent measurement, surrender value and policyholder behaviour, unit of 
account, revenue recognition and presentation, presentation of premiums, service 
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fee revenue, and investment management components. On most of these areas they 
refer to their responses to other questions. However, there is 1 commenter who 
requires no adjustments. 
 
3.7.4. Accounting profession 
20 out of 28 representatives of the group of accounting profession answer directly to 
question 15. 1 of them just states general concerns. He does not support the CEV 
approach for insurance liabilities and thinks the identified inconsistencies “highlight 
the need for the IASB to resolve future direction of liability measurement and revenue 
recognition”173.  
 
The clear majority of 16 commenters tends to agree on eliminating inconsistencies 
between the standards. Some of them mention especially the following problems that 
need to be addressed:  
- The treatment of investment contracts with participating features and the 
treatment of unit-linked contracts with a small insurance risk component are 
not clear. 
- Financial liabilities may be measured at amortised costs whereas insurance 
liabilities are measured on current values. 
- The demand deposit floor needs to be reconsidered. 
 
6 of the commenters supporting consistency think that this will not be possible for all 
matters. Inconsistencies that reflect difference in the nature of insurance contracts 
and financial instruments should remain. 3 of the commenters in favour of 
consistency as well as another 3 commenters mention that it would make more 
sense to discuss this issue later in time in conjunction with other projects, like those 
on financial instruments or the fair value measurement. 2 commenters even suggest 
the board to start a separate project on that matter. 
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3.7.5. Standard setters 
There are 16 out of 19 standard setters that give their opinion on this question. 8 
standard setters agree generally with the board’s view and prefer to eliminate 
inconsistencies. They name the deposit floor, surrender values, the CEV and 
standards that apply to insurance and investment contracts as the most significant 
inconsistencies that need to be removed. Similar to most of the other groups, 2 of 
these commenters think some inconsistencies will not be removable because they 
reflect the unique characteristics of the underlying contract type. 
 
Only 1 standard setter comments the issues identified in appendix B of the DP. He 
mainly refers to his answers to related questions or suggests that the treatments and 
principles in IAS 39 should be maintained.  
 
4 commenters think the board should not make any efforts to avoid the 
inconsistencies between the standards. Each of them states a different reason: 
- 1 commenter says he “reject[s] the concept to account for insurance contracts 
as financial instruments. Hence, an amendment of IAS 39 in this regard is not 
necessary because IAS 39 would not be applicable.”174 
- 1 standard setter mentions that, if the scope of the phase II standard includes 
investment contracts with discretionary participation features, it would allow 
the same accounting regardless of the classification of the contract.175 
- 1 standard setter thinks some inconsistencies are justified because they reflect 
the different nature of insurance contracts.176 
- 1 commenter disagrees “that the treatment of financial liabilities should be 
changed based on the discussion on insurance liabilities”177.  
 
3 commenters do not wish to comment on the problem of inconsistency in 
conjunction with insurance contracts. They think the board should first continue other 
projects like the review of IAS 39, the fair value measurement generally and the 
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revision of the conceptual framework and then overall discuss inconsistencies 
between standards. 
 
3.7.6. Supervisors 
There are only 7 supervisors of which 3 answer to the question. 2 commenters 
support the board’s intention to eliminate the inconsistencies between the treatment 
of insurance contracts and IAS 39 for financial instruments. 1 of them is well 
persuaded that the CEV approach is appropriate for insurance liabilities and should 
be considered to be adopted on other standards as well. There is 1 commenter that 
comments directly on the issues identified in appendix B of the DP. He states on 
nearly all of these issues that the existing IAS 39 should not be changed or that the 
treatment should follow the existing IAS 39. 
 
3.7.7. Financial service providers 
13 out of 21 financial service providers give an opinion on this matter. There is 
tendency towards avoiding inconsistencies, as 8 commenters do support the board’s 
view. They especially support the CEV as the fair value and suggest to change 
valuation under IAS 39. 2 of these commenters acknowledge that there are 
limitations for consistency in treatment of insurance contracts and financial 
instruments because of their different characteristics.  
 
2 financial service providers think that some inconsistencies are appropriate. They 
also name the different characteristics as the reason for inconsistencies. A different 
treatment under IAS 39 and the standard for insurance contracts is acceptable 
“where the measurement basis specified for the items under those Standards 
differs”178 and for the fact that “insurance contracts transfer insurance risk as 
opposed to financial risk”179. 
 
There are 2 commenters that think that it is yet too early to comment on this matter 
as some more standards may be revised in the next years. 1 financial service 
provider proposes to review the revised IFRS 4 in a few years and then compare it 
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with other standards. There is another commenter that gives no general statement on 
whether inconsistencies should be avoided or not, but he comments extensively on 
the topics stated in appendix B of the DP. These comments mainly recap the board’s 
argumentations in the DP and the commenter’s views on related questions. 
 
3.7.8. Others 
In this group only 5 out of 18 commenters answer to question 15. The comments are 
heterogeneous. 1 commenter agrees with the board’s view to achieve consistency. 
But this commenter mentions that “it is an open question in which direction 
convergence should take place if accounting more generally is not yet ready for full 
FV [fair value] accounting”180. 1 commenter does not share the board’s view because 
he thinks that inconsistencies are acceptable due to the fundamental differences 
between insurance contracts and other financial products.181 Another commenter 
states that he does not support the CEV approach at all and there would be no 
inconsistencies with IAS 39 if this approach would not apply. 
 
At least 2 commenters share an opinion. They think that these issues should not be 
discussed yet. It is better to think about these inconsistencies when reviewing the 
IAS 39 for financial instruments.  
 
3.7.9. Summary 
Overall, the commenters think that it is generally a good idea to eliminate 
inconsistencies between the standards. However, a lot of commenters see reasons 
to keep some inconsistencies in order to reflect the differences in the nature of 
insurance contracts and other financial instruments. 
 
Many commenters suggest the board to discuss these issues not only in conjunction 
with the DP of insurance contracts. There are some other related projects that will 
generate relevant inputs that also need to be considered for minimizing 
inconsistencies.  
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3.8. The commenters’ views on participating contracts 
3.8.1. Question 16 
(a)  For participating contracts, should the cash flows for each scenario incorporate 
an unbiased estimate of the policyholder dividends payable in that scenario to 
satisfy a legal or constructive obligation that exists at the reporting date? Why or 
why not? 
(b)  An exposure draft of June 2005 proposed amendments to IAS 37 (see 
paragraphs 247–253 of this paper). Do those proposals give enough guidance 
for an insurer to determine when a participating contract gives rise to a legal or 
constructive obligation to pay policyholder dividends? 
 
3.8.2. Insurers 
42 out of 55 insurers do not answer to this question. This is because most of them 
note that their insurance product range does not include participating contracts, and 
they are not in the position to comment on this matter. So, only 13 insurers comment 
on the question. Generally, all of them support taking into account the expected cash 
flows that could occur. 7 insurers agree with part (a) of the question that the cash 
flows for each scenario incorporate an unbiased estimate of the policyholder 
dividends payable in the scenario to satisfy a legal or constructive obligation that 
exists at the reporting date. But 6 insurers do not agree with the constraint of legal or 
constructive obligation. Some of them have concerns that “the proposed criterion – 
legal or constructive obligation – for incorporation of dividends in scenario cash flows 
will be interpreted too narrowly”182. 
 
12 of the 13 commenting insurers also answer to part (b) of the question. 4 of them 
would appreciate more guidance on the term of “constructive obligation”. 3 
commenters state as reason for their view again that the definition could be 
interpreted too narrowly. 1 of them suggests that the definition “should not 
necessarily be in contradiction with future developments in relation to IAS 37”183. 1 
insurer thinks that local guidance would be needed because: “The great variety of 
                                                        
 
182 CL 17, p. 5. 
183 CL 101, p. 2. 
 75 
existing participating schemes makes it extremely difficult to write a general 
statement that works for all countries.”184 
 
6 commenters think that the proposed definition provides sufficient guidance to 
determine when a participating contract gives rise to a legal constructive obligation to 
pay policyholder dividends. There are 2 more insurers that think no guidance is 
necessary at all. But this is not surprising as these 2 commenters belong to the group 
that does not think that this obligation criterion is appropriate for measuring 
participating contracts. 
 
3.8.3. Actuaries 
There are 14 actuaries of which 10 answer to question 16, part (a). 4 commenters 
agree with the board’s suggested measurement method for participating contracts. 
They think this is “consistent with current portfolio exit value”185 and with “the nature 
of the contracts and will provide meaningful information to users of financial 
statements”186. 1 of these commenters additionally mentions that it would be more 
appropriate to exclude the “established pattern of past practice” among practice of 
constructive obligation stated in the DP, and it should only apply to the case that the 
“insurer has indicated to other parties that it will accept certain responsibilities”.187 
There are 5 actuaries that do not overall agree with the board’s definition. They think 
the limitation to dividends with legal or constructive obligations is not appropriate. A 
wider definition should be implemented. 1 of them argues that “most of users of 
financial statements are interested in total expected contractual cash flows, even if 
they do not represent a legal or constructive obligation as currently defined in IAS 37, 
but nevertheless they comply with the definition of a liability given in the Framework, 
paragraph 60”188. The remaining actuary suggests using the national regulations of 
Sweden. 
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8 actuaries also comment on part (b) of the question. Half of them think the proposed 
amendments to IAS 37 give sufficient guidance on when a participating contract 
gives rise to a legal or constructive obligation to pay policyholder dividend. The other 
4 commenters require further explanations. 2 of them think specific insurance-
oriented guidance should be added. 1 mentions that local guidance for each country 
based on its own legal system is necessary. Another commenter thinks it is not clear 
whether under the proposed amendments constructive obligations to future 
policyholders will be recognised. 
 
3.8.4. Accounting profession 
18 out of 28 commenters in this group give their opinion on participating contracts. 16 
comment directly on part (a) of the question. The majority of 9 commenters agrees 
more or less with the board’s approach. Some of them support their view by adding 
that including the proposed cash flows results in providing relevant information to the 
users of the financial statements. However, there are 6 commenters that do not fully 
agree with the board’s view. Similar to other groups they criticise the limitation of 
constructive obligations. Although they explicate their opinions in various ways, they 
all come down to the following core argument: only including dividends where there 
exists constructive obligation is too limiting because all expected cash flows should 
be considered. 1 commenter disagrees with all of these views. He suggests the 
following approach: “the recognition and derecognition requirements of IAS 39 should 
[...] apply to insurance accounting. Consequently the focus should be in contractual 
obligations, with these then being measured on the basis of expected cash flows.”189 
 
Only 8 commenters also answer to part (b) of the question. To 4 of them the existing 
amendments to IAS 37 are sufficient for determining when a participating contract 
gives rise to a legal or constructive obligation. The other 4 commenters are not 
satisfied with the given guidance on constructive obligations. They require further 
clarification. Regardless of whether they think the guidance given is sufficient or not, 
some commenters suggest that the board should include guidance on legal or 
contructive obligations directly in the new standard for insurance contracts rather 
than just referring to IAS 37. 
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2 commenters only give a general statement. They think that the issue not only 
affects insurance liabilities and that the board should consider it more generally. 1 
suggests to hand this issue to the IASB project for liabilities and equity.  
 
3.8.5. Standard setters 
17 out of 19 standard setters comment at least on a part of this question. The 16 
comments on part (a) are heterogeneous. 7 commenters agree with the board’s view. 
But the remaining standard setters state all kinds of concerns. 3 commenters think 
that the board’s approach is too limiting in matters of legal and constructive 
obligations. 2 standard setters would prefer expected future cash flows rather than 
estimated policyholder dividends as measurement basis. 2 commenters disagree 
with the board’s view at all: 
- 1 standard setter thinks “participation of policyholders is to be considered as 
part of the best estimate liability”190.  
- 1 commenter is of the opinion that regardless of the existence of a legal or 
constructive obligation, “if the value of the liability is linked to the value of the 
assets, it would be inconsistent to recognize the value of the liability when the 
corresponding increase in the asset value is not recognised”191. 
 
2 commenters think that the DP does not provide enough detailed analyses and 
explanations on several issues concerning participating contracts and therefore they 
require further research.  
 
Only 3 out of 14 standard setters commenting on part (b) think that the given 
guidance is sufficient. The clear majority of 8 commenters requires further guidance. 
It is again the definition of constructive obligations that seems not to be satisfactory 
to most of these commenters. 1 commenter thinks that the IAS 37 should not be 
used at all for insurance purposes. The remaining 2 commenters just give a general 
statement on IAS 37. They wait for the revised version of IAS 37 before any 
arguments or conclusions on participating contracts are given. 
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3.8.6. Supervisors 
In this group 4 out of 7 supervisors comment on participating contracts. 3 of them 
generally agree with the board’s view on measuring participating contracts. Though 1 
commenter admits that constructive obligations should only be recognised at the 
reporting date “if it is probable that the insurer will make the payment”192.  
 
There is 1 commenter that does not agree with the board’s view. He thinks that the 
proposed approach includes artificial constraints on the cash flows. This is not 
consistent with the CEV measurement attribute and therefore should not apply.193 
 
3 commenters also answer directly to part (b) of the question. 2 supervisors think the 
existing guidance on legal or constructive obligations is sufficient. 1 commenter 
would prefer that the standard for insurance contracts should include a clear 
statement about constructive obligations. 
 
3.8.7. Financial service providers 
For financial service providers this question seems to be not that relevant as only 10 
out of 21 representatives of this group at least answer to a part of this question. 9 
financial service providers comment on part (a). Compared to other groups, their 
views are largely homogeneous. 7 commenters agree with the board’s view on this 
issue. Only 2 commenters state that they disagree with the proposed restriction, 
respectively constructive obligation criterion, which is deemed to be too limiting. 
 
7 financial service providers answer to the second part. Solely 2 commenters think 
the given guidance is acceptable. 3 financial service providers do not support the 
definitions given in IAS 37, mainly because they think that the new definition in the 
revised IAS 37 may be too restricting. The remaining 2 commenters do not support a 
reference to IAS 37. They would prefer specific guidance to be included in the new 
standard for insurance contracts. 
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3.8.8. Others 
6 out of 18 representatives of this group give their opinion on this question, whereas 
1 commenter does not refer to part (a) and 1 commenter does not refer to part (b). 
Only 2 commenters agree with the board’s view on part (a) of the question. For 3 
commenters this definition seems to be too narrow. They mention different reasons: 
- The definition circumscribes the CEV by reference to accounting rules for 
recognising assets and liabilities. This is conceptually irrelevant to the CEV 
and the results in “synthetic exit values”.194 
- All profit sharing developments should be included in the cash flows.195 
- “Most of the dividends and variable interests corresponding to the individual 
life contract are not linked to the behaviour of any given economic index, so 
they should be part of the definition of inferred (assumed) obligations and they 
should be included in the valuation of liabilities in order to achieve an 
adequate valuation.”196 
 
Concerning part (b) of the question, 2 commenters think the guidance given through 
amendments to IAS 37 is sufficient for participating contracts. 3 commenters do not 
agree with that view. They either think the given guidance may be too restrictive 
regarding future dividends and the definition of constructive obligations, or think that 
more specific guidance for insurers would be useful. 
 
3.8.9. Summary 
Compared to other questions, the number of commenters answering to question 16 
is quite low. However, among all comments there are only very few that totally 
disagree with the board’s view on the first part of the question. About the half of the 
commenters agrees with the proposed treatment of participating contracts. But there 
is still a large number of commenters that criticize the constructive obligations 
criterion. Most of them think this is too restrictive as all expected cash flows should 
be allowed to be included.  
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A similar argument arises within the comments on the second part. Those that are 
not satisfied with the guidance provided mainly mention the definition of a 
constructive obligation to be not broad enough. A lot of commenters would prefer 
specific and clear explanations within the new standard for insurance contracts rather 
than just referring to IAS 37.  
 
3.9. The commenters’ views on unit-linked contracts 
3.9.1. Question 17 
Should the Board do some or all of the following to eliminate accounting mismatches 
that could arise for unit-linked contracts? Why or why not? 
(a)  Permit or require insurers to recognise treasury shares as an asset if they are 
held to back a unit-linked liability (even though they do not meet the 
Framework’s definition of an asset). 
(b)  Permit or require insurers to recognise internally generated goodwill of a 
subsidiary if the investment in that subsidiary is held to back a unit-linked 
liability (even though IFRSs prohibit the recognition of internally generated 
goodwill in all other cases). 
(c)  Permit or require insurers to measure assets at fair value through profit or loss if 
they are held to back a unit-linked liability (even if IFRSs do not permit that 
treatment for identical assets held for another purpose). 
(d)  Exclude from the current exit value of a unit-linked liability any differences 
between the carrying amount of the assets held to back that liability and their 
fair value (even though some view this as conflicting with the definition of 
current exit value). 
 
3.9.2. Insurers 
Only 14 out of 55 insurers answer to question 17. Not all of them refer to all of the 4 
proposed possibilities in detail. There is only 1 commenter that disagrees with the 
board’s idea of introducing insurance-specific exceptions in order to avoid accounting 
mismatches. This commenter prefers generally revised accounting requirements and 
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the application of the fair value option under IAS 39 to reduce mismatches.197 1 
commenter solely states that the DP does not cover this issue accurately and hence, 
more specific considerations should be done due to the importance of unit-linked 
contracts in this commenter’s country.198  
 
However, the clear majority of 12 insurers absolutely agrees with the board’s general 
intension to eliminate accounting mismatches to the greatest extent possible. All of 
them also agree that the reason for these accounting mismatches is the different 
treatment in measuring assets and liabilities and therefore consistency needs to be 
created. 9 commenters explicitly support the suggested practice mentioned under 
part (a) of the question. 2 of them also name concrete reasons for this view: 
- This exception is reasonable “since the insurer would presumably not have the 
intent or ability to cancel these shares or use them for general account 
purposes”199. 
- Treasury shares should not be treated differently to other investments if the 
investment “is done to take advantage of short-term price movements”200. 
 
A few commenters would even encourage the board to extend this approach to non-
linked contracts, e.g. participating contracts. 
 
There are also 6 commenters supporting the suggestion under part (b) of the 
question. A minority of 2 insurers would not support this view. All of the 10 insurers 
referring to part (c) think that this method is appropriate and should be permitted. 1 of 
them acknowledges that this would conflict with other IFRS requirements but that the 
elimination of accounting mismatches justifies these conflicts.201 The board’s 
suggestion stated under part (d) is the only that does not obtain broad approval. Only 
2 insurers would support this approach, but the majority of 7 insurers opposes it. 
Their main argument against it is that adjustments in the valuation are not 
appropriate in this case. 
 
                                                        
 
197 cf. CL 10, p. 11. 
198 cf. CL 112, p. 2. 
199 CL 102, p. 40. 
200 CL 46, p. 15. 
201 cf. CL 46, p. 15. 
 82 
3.9.3. Actuaries 
Half of the 14 actuaries in this group comment on this question. 1 commenter states 
generally that the board should consider other potential options to avoid accounting 
mismatches.202 The other 6 actuaries refer to at least 1 of the 4 proposed 
approaches. 4 commenters agree with the proposal under part (a). 1 of them limits 
his approval to the extent that “the shares are part of an outside/managed fund such 
as an index fund or mutual fund managed by a third party”203. 2 commenters explicitly 
disagree with the first proposal. There are 3 actuaries that support the method 
suggested under part (b) of the question, and only 1 actuary that opposes it. On 
suggestion (c) and (d) in each case there are 5 commenters agreeing with the 
board’s proposal and 1 disagreeing. Some commenters limit their acceptance on 
proposal (d) to certain situations, e.g. “where the benefits cash flows are directly 
linked to the value of the underlying asset”204. It is interesting that 1 of the 
commenters agreeing with (d) disagrees with all the other approaches proposed. 
However, there is a general tendency towards supporting all methods that eliminate 
accounting mismatches. 
 
3.9.4. Accounting profession 
Out of 28 representatives of this group, only 17 comment on this question. Most of 
them give a general statement on unit-linked contracts and the accounting 
mismatches that could arise. Basically all commenters conclude that accounting 
mismatches should be avoided. But most of the commenters (5) think that it is not 
appropriate to define specific rules or make exceptions for unit-linked insurance 
contracts. They suggest the board to reconsider related accounting and 
measurement in a more general way. 2 commenters mention that this does not only 
affect insurance contracts and hence should be considered in conjunction with other 
IFRS and IASB projects. Another 2 commenters come to the same conclusion as the 
board: at this point they are not able to clearly decide whether to avoid accounting 
mismatches through the proposed approaches or through other adjustments. 1 
commenter suggests the following practice: “All obligations arising under insurance 
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contracts should be recognised as liability, including those that are linked to value of 
investments. [...] We believe that the presentation of assets as one separate line is 
the most transparent categorisation.”205 
 
There are 7 commenters that refer to each of the proposed approaches specifically. 
The comments on the proposals (a) to (c) are all the same: 5 commenters agree and 
2 commenters disagree on each. The opponents of these approaches mention as a 
core reason to support their view that it would create inconsistency with other IFRS 
requirements resulting in a different treatment with entities that do not issue unit-
linked insurance contacts. Although most commenters support the first 3 proposals of 
the board, only 1 agrees with the approach stated under part (d) of the question. This 
is the only commenter is that thinks that the reasons for adjusting listed in the DP are 
reasonable. The clear majority of 6 commenters does not think that insurance 
liabilities should be adjusted. 
 
3.9.5. Standard setters 
16 out of 19 standard setters comment on question 17. Not all of them give a 
statement on each proposal. 2 commenters generally mention that the board should 
not allow rules or exceptions solely for unit-linked insurance contracts. They prefer 
the board to review the underlying principles in order to find a more general solution 
on these issues. 1 standard setter just says that all assets should be measured at fair 
value without going into more detail.206 1 commenter stands out among all others 
because he thinks “the Board should do nothing to eliminate the so-called 
‘accounting-mismatches’ that could arise for unit-linked contracts”207. He even thinks 
just the suggested approaches would result in “accounting mismatches”, mainly 
because it would limit the consistency and comparability with non-unit-linked 
contracts.  
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Beside these general statements there are also some commenters that answer 
specifically to 1 or more of the 4 parts of the question. 9 standard setters support the 
proposal under part (a). 3 of them limit their approvals in the following ways: 
- 1 agrees on this approach for shares that are held purely for the beneficial 
ownership of policyholders.208 
- 1 agrees only because of pragmatic reasons. Theoretically such constructs 
should be reflected in equity.209 
- 1 thinks own shares should only be recognised as an asset “if the whole risk of 
the portfolio is transferred to the policyholders and the portfolio is deemed to 
be a kind of trustee account for the account of the policyholders“210. 
 
There is 1 commenter that does not support this approach at all because it is 
inconsistent with the framework. On the second proposal under part (b) of the 
question there are 6 standard setters that support this approach. 3 standard setters 
do not agree with that. A clear majority of 10 commenters support the third approach 
and the fair value measurement. 1 of them even thinks that all assets should be 
measured at fair value. Only 2 standard setters disagree with that proposal. Similar to 
most of the other groups there is only 1 standard setter supporting the suggested 
approach under part (d). This commenter does only support this proposal because 
he thinks this is more pragmatic than changing the treatment of assets towards a fair 
value measurement approach.211 But the remaining 8 commenters do not support 
this because they do not consider the resulting value to be consistent with the CEV 
approach. 
 
3.9.6. Supervisors 
Like within most of the other questions only 3 out of 7 supervisors comment on this 
matter. 2 of them think that accounting mismatches should be eliminated but this 
does not only apply to unit-linked insurance contracts. The board should try to find a 
more general solution that works for all affected standards. The third supervisor only 
comments on 2 of the 4 proposals. This commenter would agree on the approach 
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stated under part (a), but does not support the approach stated under part (b) 
because it is also not allowed under IAS 38 for intangible assets.212 
 
3.9.7. Financial service providers 
10 out of 21 financial service providers answer to question 17. Most of them mention 
explicitly that they support the board’s intention to eliminate accounting mismatches 
as far as possible. 5 financial service providers support the proposal under part (a) of 
the question. Only 2 commenters do not think that treasury shares should be 
recognised as an asset. The same 2 commenters do also disagree with the 
suggested solution stated under part (b). There are still 4 financial service providers 
that would support this approach. The comments on part (c) are homogeneous as 
they are all supportive. The group of financial service providers is the only group 
where especially the suggested approach in part (c) is preferred. Most of the other 
groups support primarily proposal (a). But similar to the other groups is that the 
majority of 5 financial service providers do not agree with the suggestion under part 
(d) of the question. They do not think that the value this method would create is 
correct. Only 3 commenters would support this approach, but these commenters 
would generally support any action that eliminates accounting mismatches. 
 
3.9.8. Others 
6 out of 18 representatives of this group give a statement on this question. Only 1 of 
them refers directly to the proposals (a) to (d). This commenter supports the board’s 
general view that accounting mismatches should be avoided. Therefore the 
commenter agrees with the proposals (b) and (c) but not with (d). For the suggested 
approach under part (a) this commenter requires “the board to fully explore a) and its 
possible implications”213. All of the other commenters give only general comments on 
accounting mismatches and unit-linked contracts. They suggest other ways to avoid 
the identified accounting mismatches and require deeper or broader considerations 
on these measurement issues.  
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3.9.9. Summary 
All in all the commenters’ views on the approaches proposed by the board are not 
homogenous. There is a slight tendency towards supporting the proposals (a) to (c), 
i.e. adjusting the treatment of assets in conjunction with unit-linked insurance 
contracts. Most commenters do not support the approach stated under part (d) of the 
question. It is interesting that most of the commenters agreeing with 1 or more of the 
first 3 approaches do not support the fourth approach, and vice versa. 
 
There are a lot of commenters that answer to the question in a more general way. It 
is often mentioned that there should be no specific rules or exceptions for unit-linked 
insurance contracts as avoiding accounting mismatches should be an aim within 
other forms of contracts and standards as well. They often request the board to 
consider these issues more generally. 
 
3.10. The commenters’ views on presentation of premiums 
3.10.1. Question 18 
Should an insurer present premiums as revenue or as deposits? Why? 
 
3.10.2. Insurers 
32 out of 55 insurers comment on this question. There is a clearly identifiable trend 
towards presenting premiums as revenue. 23 insurers support this kind of 
presentation. There are 4 reasons that are stated often to justify this view: 
- In general or short-term insurance business “insurers provide risk services to 
policyholders and for the risk underwriting and other risk services receive 
revenue in the form of premium”214. 
- Premiums earned or revenue in general is commonly used as a key indicator 
to evaluate an entity’s performance. This is why premiums should be 
presented as revenue to provide information to users of the financial 
statements. 
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- Insurance premiums meet the definitions under several related accounting 
standards like IAS 18, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) 6. 
- Insurance premiums do not withstand a comparison with bank deposits and 
therefore should not be presented as deposit. 
 
However, it should be mentioned that a lot of the commenters in favour of presenting 
premium as revenue do limit this view to general insurance and non-life insurance 
business, as indicated in the first reason above. For some insurers the answer to this 
question also depends on what they think about unbundling. Commenters that 
support unbundling of an insurance contract’s components limit their proposal on 
revenue presentation to the extent that unbundling is not required, i.e. the contract 
contains no deposit components. Opponents of unbundling would always support the 
presentation as revenue. 
 
4 commenters think that the presentation of premiums depends on the kind of 
contract underlying respectively the main features of the contract. Presentation as 
revenue may be appropriate for contracts transferring significant insurance risk or 
that are short-termed. Especially property and casualty contracts are mentioned as 
examples. For other insurance contracts it may be proper to present premiums as 
deposits. 
 
There are 5 insurers that conclude on this issue in the same way as the board. They 
are not able to clearly decide on this at that time, although they think it is important 
and a uniform approach may be desirable. Some mention that it is a “difficult and 
complex area and will need further careful consideration as the standard is 
developed”215. 1 of these commenters just states that it is first priority what users of 
financial statements think and therefore it may be the best solution to ask them which 
method they would prefer.216 
 
                                                        
 
215 CL 117, p. 18. 
216 cf. CL 62, p. 18 – 19. 
 88 
3.10.3. Actuaries 
Out of 14 commenters in this group 9 actuaries answer to question 18. There are 6 
commenters that would always present premiums as revenue. They name different 
reasons for this view but the most frequent argument simply is that all contracts that 
qualify as insurance should be treated as a whole. Hence, the different components 
should not be unbundled and the whole premium should be presented as revenue. 1 
actuary even says that premiums can never be deposits because they do not belong 
to the policyholders, as insurers use the premiums to fulfil the obligations for a whole 
portfolio of insurance contracts. 217  
 
2 acturaries would use both, presentation as revenue or as deposit depending on the 
components of the contract. 1 commenter is not able to prefer a view and therefore 
presents 2 approaches:218  
- Show all premiums as deposits because the income statement should reflect 
what the shareholder is entitled to. 
- Show premiums as revenue as this is the easier approach and current method 
of insurers. 
 
3.10.4. Accounting profession 
20 out of 28 representatives of accounting profession answer to the question. The 
comments vary a lot. In this group there are 2 commenters that prefer premiums to 
be presented as deposits out of different reasons: 
- 1 thinks that the “acceptance of insurance risk is more similar to writing of 
options or accepting deposits than it is to providing a service”219. Financial 
options under IAS 39 do not recognise cash received as revenue. Insurance 
contracts should be treated in the same way.220 
- The other 1 argues that most life insurance products have a deposit element 
and therefore premium should be presented as deposit. 
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There is a majority of 8 commenters that wishes premiums to be presented as 
revenue. Their main argument is that insurance contracts reflect some kind of 
service. Provisions for services not related to insurance contracts are regularly 
accounted as revenue. Hence, the “insurance service” should also be accounted this 
way. 4 commenters support to permit the use of both presentation possibilities, 
depending on the type of contract. The insurer may either have a free choice on how 
he presents premiums or should distinguish between long-term and short-term 
insurance contracts. 
 
1 commenter is remarkable because he would neither present premiums as revenue 
nor as deposits. This commenter suggests revenues to be recognised as the release 
of risk or service margins and changes in net liabilities.221 The remaining 5 
commenters state more general considerations. 2 of them just mention that the issue 
on presentation should be considered in consistency with the issue on unbundling. 
The other 3 commenters think that this issue is better off to be discussed in the 
context of the IASB project on financial statement presentation. 
 
3.10.5. Standard setters 
15 out of 19 standard setters comment on this matter. Most of them argue in a similar 
way. There are 7 standard setters that would generally present premiums as revenue 
except there is a deposit element that can be unbundled in a non-arbitrary way. In 
that case this component should be accounted for as deposit. Another 3 commenters 
share a similar view. They would support both possibilities of presenting insurance 
premiums depending on the type of the underlying contract or type of elements 
included in the contract. They especially think that premiums related to investment 
elements should not be presented as revenue. 
 
1 commenter proposes an accounting model where “the revenue entries are 
triggered by corresponding decreases of the liability and deferred income”222. 4 
standard setters solely mention general considerations like the conjunction to issues 
of other IASB projects. 
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3.10.6. Supervisors 
Out of 5 supervisors only 3 answer to this question. Their comments are similar to 
those of the group of standard setters. 2 supervisors think that the presentation of 
premiums is linked to unbundling of insurance contracts. Premiums that relate to 
insurance risks should be presented as revenue and only unbundled deposit 
components should be accounted for as deposit. The remaining commenter thinks 
that overarching principles for recognition are necessary to decide on this issue. 
 
3.10.7. Financial service providers 
13 out of 21 financial service providers answer to question 18. There are 6 
commenters that would support presenting premiums as revenue exclusively. The 
main reason for their view is that this is consistent with current practice and they see 
no reason to change this. Users of financial statements expect this presentation and 
hence this approach provides best information to them. Some financial service 
providers also mention that the nature of an insurance contract is more like a service 
contract and therefore premiums should be treated as revenue.  
 
However, there are 6 financial service providers that would support both, 
presentation as revenue and presentation as deposits, depending on the 
characteristics. 4 of them think the treatment depends on the type of contract. 
Presentation as revenue is appropriate for non-life or short-term contracts and 
contracts with adequate risk transfer. For other types of insurance contracts, e.g. life 
insurance, it may be more appropriate to present premiums as deposits. 1 
commenter says that the presentation of premiums should be consistent with the 
treatment of the contract, i.e. unbundling. The part of the premium relating to the 
unbundled insurance components should be presented as revenue and the part 
related to the unbundled investment components should be presented as deposit. 
There is 1 commenter that supports both distinctions. He would present premiums as 
revenue if:223 
- the underlying contract is a pure risk contract,  
- there is an unbundled risk component and  
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- the contract cannot be unbundled.  
1 financial service provider solely comments in general, stating that this issue is not 
so important, but he would prefer a solution that is not “bifurcated”.224 
 
3.10.8. Others 
6 out of 18 representatives of this group comment on question 18. 1 of them just 
states largely general considerations without proposing a concrete answer to the 
question. The commenter says that the key issue of how different approaches 
provide information for managers and users of the financial statements should be 
considered when deciding on presentation matters.225  
 
The other 5 commenters share more or less the same view, as they are all in favour 
of presenting premiums as revenue. The main reasons they name to support this 
view are that this provides best information for uses of the financial statements and 
that it reflects the transfer of risk. 2 of them admit that this is only thoroughly valid for 
non-life insurance contracts and insurance contracts without deposit components.  
 
3.10.9. Summary 
Generally 3 kinds of views among all groups can be identified: 
- Premiums should always be presented as revenue. 
- The presentation of premiums depends on the type of the underlying contract. 
Short-term or non-life insurance contracts should present premiums as 
revenue. Long-term or life insurance contracts should present premiums as 
deposits. 
- The presentation of premiums should be consistent with the results of 
unbundling the contract. Premiums of the insurance components should be 
presented as revenue and premiums of the investment components should be 
presented as deposits. 
 
These views are relatively uniformly distributed among all commenters. There are 
hardly any commenters that would always prefer premiums to be presented as 
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deposits. All of them state similar arguments to support their view. They mainly name 
the best information to the users of the financial statement and the best method 
reflecting the nature of the contract as reasons.  
 
3.11. The commenters’ views on separate presentation of 
income and expense items 
3.11.1. Question 19 
Which items of income and expense should an insurer present separately on the face 
of its income statement? Why? 
 
3.11.2. Insurers 
29 out of 55 insurers comment on question 19. Beside a group of commenters that 
only provide general statements, 2 main groups of comments can be identified: 
- those that cannot answer to the question at this point in time and 
- those that give concrete suggestions on what should be presented on the face 
of an insurer’s income statement. 
 
9 insurers belong to the first group. They think this issue cannot be discussed at this 
point, because it depends on final decisions on issues of previous questions, e.g. the 
measurement model or it should be discussed within other IASB projects, mainly the 
financial statement presentation project. 
 
The bigger part of 13 insurers belongs to the second group providing concrete 
suggestions. It is difficult to evaluate this group in detail because they partly refer to 
different levels of aggregation when proposing concrete items. Furthermore, some 
comments solely apply to a certain kind of insurance business and therefore quote 
very specific items. However, most commenters agree with the following: 
- Revenue should incorporate sub-groups like premiums, investment income 
and other income. 
- Premiums should be divided in at least written and earned premiums. 
- Tax expenses should be presented out-of-line with other expenses. 
- Income and expenses arising from reinsurance contracts should be presented 
separately within the categories. 
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The remaining 7 insurers solely give general statements. Most of them mention that 
detailed disclosure requirements should be required. Commenters from Australia and 
New Zealand suggest taking over their respective national regulations. Among all 
insurers it is often mentioned that whatever the presentation of the income statement 
includes it is important “to provide the users meaningful information to assess 
financial performance and make informed decisions”226. 
 
3.11.3. Actuaries 
Only 6 out of 14 actuaries answer to this question. The majority of 4 of them thinks 
that a “minimal set of items”227 is sufficient and the focus should be on detailed 
disclosures and notes to the financial statements. Too much information on the face 
of the financial statements may result in not providing appropriate transparency to the 
financial statement users.228 1 commenter thinks that the traditional income 
statement extended to a “source of profit” analysis is sufficient.229 1 actuary just 
generally mentions that this not really an actuarial issue, but as actuaries need to be 
able to calculate their components proper actuarial input should be considered.230 
 
3.11.4. Accounting profession 
There are 28 representatives in this group of which 20 answer to this question. The 
majority of 11 of them thinks that there can be no answer as long as there are other 
related issues that need to be addressed first. These commenters mention especially 
the board’s projects on performance reporting respectively financial statement 
presentation as well as the final measurement approach for insurance contracts. 3 
commenters suggest that the income statement should include detailed information 
about the changes in the liabilities. They think this is important information to the 
users of the financial statements in order to understand an insurer’s results. 
 
The remaining 6 commenters state various comments. Some think that the new 
standard should only demand some key items that should be presented on the face 
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of the income statement. 1 commenter even thinks that there should be no 
mandatory requirements at all.231 Another commenter believes that: “A traditional 
income statement provides relevant and reliable information to the users of financial 
statements.”232  
 
3.11.5. Standard setters 
15 out of 19 standard setters comment on this question. 2 major groups of comments 
can be identified. 6 standard setters belong to the group that would appreciate a 
principle-based presentation of the income statement and therefore refer to IAS 1. 
Major line items should be presented in order to provide clear information to the 
users of the financial statements. Additional line items can be presented on the face 
of the income statement “when such presentation is relevant to an understanding of 
the entity’s financial performance”233. Details may also be disclosed in notes to the 
income statement.  
 
5 standard setters belong to the other major group. They think the issue of 
presentation can only be discussed within the scope of the financial statement 
presentation project or after finally concluding on the issues of recognition and 
measurement of insurance contracts.  
 
3 setters state concrete items that should be presented on the face of the income 
statement. 2 of them base their lines on the different kind of income and expenses of 
an insurer. They would use gross numbers and separate lines for reinsurance items. 
The other commenter gives details for a margin presentation. He lists lines for 
measuring the primary margin of the insurance transactions and for the financial 
margin and investment contracts.234  
 
The remaining commenter solely provides the general statement that the financial 
statements should provide necessary information to understand the result of the 
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insurer. This commenter suggests the board to ask a group of users to identify what 
presentation and disclosures would be helpful.235 
 
3.11.6. Supervisors 
3 out of 7 supervisors answer to the question. All of them state different comments. 1 
generally mentions that this use requires a formal consultation and assessment 
process to define overarching principles.236 The other 2 supervisors comment more 
specifically. 1 of them thinks that many national reporting practices “provide useful 
information to users of the financial statements for calculating key performance 
indicators”237 like combined ratios. These should be kept. The third commenter 
prefers to present changes in the carrying amount of insurance liabilities as a single 
line item in profit or loss. Details and specified components should be presented in 
the notes to the financial statements.238 
 
3.11.7. Financial service providers 
Only 10 out of 21 financial service providers comment on this question. Their 
answers are heterogeneous. There are 3 commenters that would support the 
requirements of IAS 1 with adequate additional disclosures or notes as far as these 
help users to better understand the insurer’s activities. 1 commenter proposes a 
similar approach but without referring to IAS 1. Furthermore, this commenter 
suggests specific segment disclosures to life or non-life insurances. 2 financial 
service providers think it is premature to answer to this question as there are other 
issues that should be addressed first, e.g. the financial statement presentation 
project.  
 
The remaining 4 financial service providers suggest the following different 
approaches: 
- Beside the general presentation of policyholder receipts as premiums and 
policyholder payments as claims, there should be included more detailed 
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information on net investment income and on changes in actuarial 
liabilities..239 
- There should be an analysis for the changes in the carrying amount of 
insurance liabilities for life insurance business.240 
- 1 commenter suggests the following main line items: new business-new 
policyholders, previous years’ business, investing and financing activities and 
net profit (loss).241 
- Another commenter proposes a list of items that he thinks provide important 
information and help understanding the process. These items are: gross 
premiums written, net premiums written, earned premium, losses, policy 
acquisition expenses and operating expenses.242 
 
3.11.8. Others 
6 out of 18 representatives of this group give a statement on question 19. 3 of them 
principally agree that the classic income statement should be used. They either list 
the corresponding items or mention that the currently presented income statement 
may be extended with some additional disclosures. 1 commenter suggests “the 
income statement should include all changes in the carrying amount of insurance 
liabilities”243 and that shadow accounting should not be allowed. The other 2 
commenters state general comments. Like within other groups, the Australian 
commenter suggests to adopt the detailed Australian disclosure requirements.244 The 
remaining commenter solely mentions that it is important that “the analyst community 
is fully involved in this regard, as they are the prime users of the output”245. 
 
3.11.9. Summary 
All in all the answers to question 19 are varying a lot. There cannot be identified a 
clear tendency among all commenters. A big part of all commenters refer to other 
related issues or other IASB projects, e.g. the measurement model or financial 
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statement presentation project, that should be addressed first before answering to 
this question. 
 
However, some commenters give concrete suggestions on what the face of an 
insurer’s income statement should look like. Some of them prefer various sub-items, 
whereas others prefer solely clear main line items. Many commenters think the 
requirements of IAS 1 should also apply to insurers and, if necessary, detailed and 
specific information could be disclosed in the notes. The remaining commenters 
solely provide general statements. 
 
3.12. The commenters’ views on changes in the carrying 
amount of insurance liabilities 
3.12.1. Question 20 
Should the income statement include all income and expense arising from changes 
in insurance liabilities? Why or why not?  
 
3.12.2. Insurers 
33 out of 55 insurers answer to question 20. The clear majority of 20 insurers agrees 
with the board’s view that all changes in insurance liabilities should be presented in 
the income statement. The main reasons for this view are: 
- It provides helpful information to the users of the financial statements. 
- This is the most transparent recognition method. 
- It would not be appropriate to show these changes elsewhere. 
 
3 of these commenters mention that the relevant changes in assets should be 
included too. Another 2 insurers additionally refer to other IASB projects, e.g. 
financial statement presentation, that may have impact on this matter and therefore 
should be considered. 
 
There are 5 insurers that would agree at least to some extent. They think the 
changes in insurance liabilities should only be included up to a certain degree or 
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under certain circumstances. 1 thinks that this is only relevant for life insurance 
liabilities, whose changes should only be presented if they are material.246 This 
commenter also lists some facts that should be included in the “change in reserve” 
line item. 1 insurer thinks that movements in foreign exchange should be material to 
be included.247 2 insurers think that all income and expense arising from changes in 
insurance liabilities should be included “unless those changes are hypothetical in 
nature”248. 1 commenter prefers a line for the changes in insurance liabilities to be 
included in the income statement and further details to be given in the notes.249  
 
5 commenters do not agree with the board’s view. They at least partly prefer 
recognising changes in insurance liabilities through equity respectively other 
comprehensive income. Most of them especially refer to accounting mismatches that 
can arise in conjunction with assets backing insurance liabilities classified as 
available-for-sale under IAS 39. Changes of such assets would be recorded in equity 
and hence, the changes of the underlying liabilities should be recorded in equity too. 
1 of these commenters even generally thinks that the income statements as a whole 
do not provide appropriate information to the users of the financial statements and 
prefers some reflection of unrealized gains and adjustments in the statement of 
comprehensive income.250 
 
The remaining 3 insurers say that they cannot or do not want to comment on this 
matter at this point in time as there are other issues that need to be clarified before. 
They mean the understanding of the measurement approach and the financial 
presentation project that should deal with this matter. It is also suggested to conduct 
a survey among users of the financial statements asking what kind of information 
they wish to be included. 
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3.12.3. Actuaries 
9 out of 14 actuaries comment on this matter. 4 of them support including all changes 
in insurance liabilities in the income statement. Another 3 actuaries would agree on 
that up to a certain degree. 2 of them think that for changes in insurance liabilities 
that solely arise from changes in the underlying assets’ value adequate disclosures 
would be sufficient. 1 of these 2 commenters furthermore thinks that effects on 
liabilities of changes in discount rates should be reflected in other comprehensive 
income.251 1 actuary thinks that changes in insurance liabilities should be included in 
the income statement only where the measurement and recognition of assets and 
liabilities are consistent.252 
 
1 actuary thinks that presenting volatility from measurement of insurance liabilities in 
the income statement may be confusing for users of the financial statement and 
therefore suggests the following alternative treatment: either present the income and 
expense arising from changes in the insurance liabilities in other comprehensive 
income and add suitable footnotes, or reflect these measurement solely through 
footnotes and not directly on the face of the financial statements.253 Another actuary 
does not mention a concrete view on this matter but expresses concerns “that 
actuaries be able to calculate the actuarial items in a non-arbitrary basis”254. The 
board should consider this when deciding on this issue. 
 
3.12.4. Accounting profession 
20 out of 28 representatives in this group answer to question 20. 11 commenters 
think that all changes in insurance liabilities should be included in the income 
statement. Most commenters add that they generally wish to avoid accounting 
mismatches and shadow accounting. In some cases, if changes in assets are 
realised in other comprehensive income, it would be more appropriate to realise the 
changes of the underlying liabilities in other comprehensive income too.  
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6 commenters think that this issue should be discussed within the scope of the 
financial presentation project. 2 commenters just mention that they think the 
traditional income statement is appropriate. 1 commenter solely states that the 
income statement generally should provide enough details to enable meaningful 
analyses to the users of the financial statements.255 These commenters give no 
further comments. 
 
3.12.5. Standard setters 
17 out of 19 standard setters answer to this question. Their views are quite 
heterogeneous. Only 6 standard setters agree with the board’s view that the income 
statement should include all changes in the carrying amount of insurance liabilities. 
The reason to support this view is for most of them that this would be consistent with 
the CEV approach. 1 of the agreeing commenters mentions that he only agrees in 
terms of presentation but not when determining profit or loss.256 This applies more to 
other questions posed in the first half of the DP. 2 standard setters generally agree to 
include the changes in liabilities in the income statement but would prefer to present 
some elements or details in the footnotes rather than on the face of the income 
statement  
 
However, there are still 2 standard setters that generally disagree to include all 
changes in the income statement. 1 commenter proposes his own approach for 
insurer’s accounting leading to a different presentation of changes in insurance 
liabilities. 6 standard setters think that it is too early to answer to this question. The 
board should first conclude on other issues, e.g. measurement of insurance contracts 
and other projects like the financial statement presentation project. The board could 
also ask some users of financial statements what they want to be presented and 
disclosed.  
 
3.12.6. Supervisors 
Similar to most of the other questions, 3 out of 7 supervisors comment on this matter. 
2 of them agree with the board’s view and support including all changes in insurance 
                                                        
 
255 cf. CL 31, p. 7. 
256 cf. CL 85, p. 15. 
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liabilities in the income statement. 1 states as reason that “premium received is 
recognised as revenue in the income statement and, therefore, any changes in the 
insurance liabilities should also be reflected”257.  
 
There is 1 commenter who thinks there needs to be an overarching criteria or 
principle for recognition purposes.258 This commenter states this general view also 
under questions 18 and 19 as they all belong to the same main issue. 
 
3.12.7. Financial service providers 
There are 28 financial service providers of which 13 answer to this question. The 
majority of 9 financial service providers supports the board’s view to include all 
changes in insurance liabilities in the income statement. They name various reasons 
for this view, including especially that there is no conceptual reason to do otherwise 
and that this approach provides most transparency to the users of the financial 
statement. 1 of these commenters admits that this approach also bears some 
disadvantages like more volatility in the income statement.259  
 
However, there are 4 commenters that disagree with the board’s view and think it is 
not the best approach to include the movements in insurance liabilities in the income 
statement. 1 thinks that the board’s approach would not be the most meaningful 
presentation of the performance and suggest that “subsequent changes in the 
measurement of insurance liabilities that relate to changes in the value in financial 
market data be recognised as an element of other comprehensive income”260. The 
other 3 commenters state reduction of complexity or volatility as reasons for not 
including the changes in the income statement.  
 
3.12.8. Others 
6 out of 18 representatives of this group comment on question 20. The clear majority 
of 5 commenters supports the board’s view to include all changes. They think it is 
proper, transparent or consistent with the treatment of assets and liabilities under a 
                                                        
 
257 CL 159, p. 12. 
258 cf. CL 143, p. 19. 
259 cf. CL 27, p. 11. 
260 CL 157, p. 13. 
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fair value, respectively the CEV, approach. 1 of these commenters is of the view that 
only a single amount in the income statement should reflect the changes in liabilities 
and details should be given through appropriate footnotes in the financial 
statements.261 
 
1 commenter disagrees to this view. He thinks in contrast to the board that there are 
practical and conceptual issues that may bear arguments against including all 
changes, stating the following examples:262 
- It is not clear how much of the change should be recognised.  
- Effects of changes in interest rates could be paradoxical. 
- The question arises whether effects of inflation should be excluded. 
 
3.12.9. Summary 
The majority of all groups tends towards including all income and expenses from 
changes in insurance liabilities in the financial statements. They think that there is no 
conceptual or practical reason not to do so, that it provides a high level of 
transparency and that it generates detailed information to users of the financial 
statements. There are commenters that would agree with that to some extent. It is 
often mentioned that the face of the financial statements should only include a single 
line item reflecting the movements in insurance liabilities and details should be given 
in the footnotes. Some commenters think that the changes in liabilities need to be 
material to be included. 
 
However, there are a few commenters that do not support including all changes in 
insurance liabilities in the income statement. Their arguments against that are that it 
causes high volatility and complexity. Furthermore, there are assets whose changes 
are recognised in other comprehensive income and therefore, the underlying 
liabilities should be treated the same way. 
 
Besides, there is a group of commenters that do not express their views on this 
question because they think that this issue should not be discussed at this point in 
                                                        
 
261 cf. CL 42, p. 4. 
262 cf. CL 11, p. 32. 
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time. First other issues concerning insurance contracts need to be addresses, 
especially the issue of measurement and recognition. Moreover, there are other IASB 
projects like the financial statement presentation project that should deal with this 
question anyway. 
 
3.13. The commenters’ views on other matters 
3.13.1. Question 21 
Do you have other comments on this paper? 
 
3.13.2. Insurers 
All insurers make comments that can be allocated to this question in some way. With 
23 commenters, more than half of all insurers mention additional issues or concerns 
on the proposed measurement methods for insurance contracts. They especially 
criticise the CEV approach and the three building blocks. While some commenters 
generally support the three building blocks, a lot of insurers do not think that the CEV 
is the best approach. 
 
14 insurers think that the board should consider field testing before implementing the 
final version of the new standard for insurance contracts. 13 insurers think that the 
new standard should be in line with “Solvency II”. 10 commenters note that the 
underlying DP does not provide sufficient statement about disclosure requirements 
for insurers. The final standard should include adequate requirements. There are 
several further topics that are addressed by 7 or more insurers: the definition of 
insurance, other IASB projects and the question of whether the same approach 
should be implemented for all kinds of insurance contracts. 
 
3.13.3. Actuaries 
All except 1 actuary state some kind of other comments on the DP. Their statements 
are heterogeneous, but there are some topics that are repeatedly dealt with:  
- 4 actuaries state general considerations about the proposed measurement 
method. 
- 3 actuaries think that the DP should pay attention to issues in conjunction with 
(deferred) taxes. 
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2 actuaries adumbrate their national regulations or practices. The remaining 
actuaries name different issues of which they think the DP does not deal accurately 
with. 
 
3.13.4. Accounting profession 
Only 2 representatives of this group give no additional comments. Like within most of 
the other groups, the majority of 15 commenters often state their general opinion 
about the proposed measurement approaches. Some commenters prefer a 
settlement value instead of the CEV.  
 
Several commenters note that the final phase II standard should include specific 
disclosure requirements for insurers. A few commenters refer to other IASB projects 
and other standards that should be considered together with the project respectively 
standard on insurance contracts.  
 
3.13.5. Standard setters 
All except 1 standard setters comment on additional issues beside the specific 
questions. More than half of them (10) somehow refer to the measurement model 
proposed in the DP. Some require a more detailed description, others solely state 
generally whether they support the proposed model or not. Similar to the other 
groups, some standard setters discuss 1 or more of the following 3 topics: disclosure 
requirements, other IASB projects and the need for field testing. 
 
3.13.6. Supervisors 
All supervisors give statements that belong to this question. The topics that are dealt 
with the most are again the measurement approach and lack of disclosure 
requirements. 1 commenter even proposes his own measurement model, calling it “A 
coherent Approach to the Treatment of Service Margins and Profit at Inception for 
Insurance Contracts”263. 
 
                                                        
 
263 CL 154, p. 1. 
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3.13.7. Financial service providers 
Only 1 financial service provider does not state any other comment on the DP. The 
comments of the other financial service providers are heterogeneous and there are 
hardly any issues that occur more often. The issue that is addressed the most is the 
proposed measurement method. 8 commenters state their opinion on the 
measurement issue. 4 commenters think the final version of the new standard should 
include detailed disclosure requirements. These seem to be the most popular topics 
among all groups. 
 
However, there are some commenters in this group expressing interesting views. 4 
financial service providers think that the IASB should work closely together with the 
FASB or even adopt the regulations of United States Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (US GAAP). 3 commenters think that the proposed accounting model in 
the DP is too difficult to understand for users of the financial statement or does not 
reach its objective of introducing a suitable accounting principle. 
 
3.13.8. Others 
In this group all except 1 commenter mention issues that can be allocated to this 
question. There are 3 topics that are addressed often: the measurement approach, 
the scope of the standard and national standards or practices that should be adopted 
by the board.  
 
3.13.9. Summary 
Apart from very few exceptions, all commenters answer somehow to the last 
question. This is because all of the following comments are taken into consideration: 
- direct answers to the question stated under an appropriate headline, 
- covering letters that include general considerations and introductory words, 
- conclusions or recommendations at the end of the letter and 
- general statements without respect to specific questions. 
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Also for question 21, only the comments of the second half of the DP have been 
taken into consideration. This is consistent with the method used for analysing the 
other questions.264 
 
The topics that are addressed the most are concerns or general statements on the 
proposed measurement model, including the CEV and the three building blocks, and 
the lack of disclosure requirements. A lot of commenters suggest the board to 
conduct field testing before the final standard is released. The interdependencies 
with other IASB projects and the regulations of “Solvency II” are also often 
mentioned. Regardless of whether commenters generally propose or oppose the 
proposals made in the DP, most of them mention in their covering letters that they 
appreciate the board’s effort to introduce a more detailed international standard for 
insurance contracts. 
 
                                                        
 
264 Details of the process of analysing the comment letters are given in chapter 3.1. Introduction. 
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4. Conclusion 
4.1. The commenters’ general view on the second half of the 
discussion paper 
Overall it cannot be said that certain groups generally tend to always agree or 
disagree with the board’s view. The views on most of the questions are 
heterogeneous throughout all of the groups. The differences in the arguments are 
mostly due to the nature of the commenters. Especially within the group of insurers 
this can be observed. There are insurers that operate only in a particular insurance 
sector. Depending on whether they belong to life or non-life insurance business their 
views apply to their kind of insurance products. But also the commenters of other 
groups are naturally biased by their profession or branch. Actuaries for example often 
mention the importance of the calculability of actuarial values under the proposed 
methods. 
 
The DP examines some controversial issues. It is not surprising that the proposed 
measurement approach is paid high attention to, as the board introduced the new 
three building blocks model and the extensive use of the fair value measurement. 
Most commenters support using the CEV approach, although there are some 
discussions on the determination of the CEV. This may be the reason why especially 
the questions of chapter 5 of the DP “Measurement – other issues” have a high rate 
of responses. Beside measurement issues also presentation issues seem to be 
important to the commenters. Most commenters agree on the general principles but 
when going into detail their views do vary a lot. As mentioned above, this is partially 
due to their professional nature because different groups consider different items as 
important. 
 
Most commenters that agree with the board’s view on an issue state the same 
reasons the board already lists in the DP. But also some of the opposing arguments 
can be found in the DP as well because the board discusses most issues in detail. 
There are only very few commenters that present alternative approaches or 
arguments when not agreeing with the board’s view. The board’s view on the issue 
addressed in question 14 (measurement of an insurance liability) is rather rejected. 
The views on question 13, 16, 18 and 19 are heterogeneous. However, there is a 
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positive tendency towards supporting most of the board’s proposals made in the 
second half of the DP.  
 
4.2. The commenters’ overall view on the discussion paper 
The conclusion made on the first half of the DP is very similar to that on the second 
half.265 As the issue of measurement directly or indirectly affects most of the 
questions in the DP, it is obvious that the commenters especially refer to the 
proposed measurement model throughout all of the questions. There are hardly any 
differences in the opinions between the groups. The differences in the 
argumentations are often due to the profession of the commenter. Overall, the 
commenters appreciate the board’s efforts and most of the board’s proposals.  
 
4.3. Link to the recent exposure draft 
The exposure draft ED/2010/8 was developed after the board reviewed the 
responses to the DP.266 Beside this, the board gained input from the IASB working 
group and the participants of a field test in 2009.267 Following the responses to the 
DP, the board decided not to carry forward some of their proposals:268 
- CEV: The original approach based on the notion of transfer is replaced by an 
approach that considers the cash flows arising when an insurer fulfils the 
contract. 
- Service margin: No separate service margin will be required. 
- Non-performance risk: Non-performance risk will not be included. 
 
This basically corresponds with the results of the analyses made in this thesis and 
the thesis on the first part of the DP. These issues are controversial and a lot of 
commenters do not support the proposals on these made in the DP.  
 
However, there are also a lot of proposals the commenters support and hence, they 
are carried forward to the exposure draft, e.g. recognising all income and expense 
                                                        
 
265 This argumentation is based on the conclusion made in Höglinger (2010). 
266 cf. Basis for Conclusions on Exposure Draft, par. BC1. 
267 cf. ED/2010/8, par. IN5. 
268 cf. IASB Homepage: Snapshot: Insurance Contracts, p. 9 – 11. 
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from insurance contracts in profit or loss or the inclusion of an explicit risk margin. 
Also, the board followed the commenters’ desire to work together with the American 
FASB and developed joint regulations on many areas.269 
 
All in all the exposure draft is largely based on the proposals of the DP. There are 
some issues and details that were changed due to the results of the field test, input 
from the comments on the DP and the convergence with the FASB. 
 
 
                                                        
 
269 cf. ED/2010/8, par. IN6. 
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Appendix B: Abstract (English) 
The IASB is working on numerous projects to develop and improve international 
accounting standards. One of the most substantial projects in the last years has been 
the “Insurance Contracts” project. The work on this project started in 1997 and was 
later split into 2 phases. The aim of phase I was to publish an interim standard 
introducing first requirements specifically for insurance contracts. Phase II started in 
2004 intending to improve the interim phase I standard IFRS 4 “Insurance Contracts”. 
In May 2007 the board achieved a milestone by publishing a discussion paper (DP) 
with preliminary views on insurance contracts. At the same time the board invited the 
public to comment on this paper until 16 November 2007. A total of 162 comment 
letters was sent by various commenters from all over the world. After reviewing these 
comments and completing further work on the insurance project, the board published 
an adjusted exposure draft in July 2010. Currently the IASB is reviewing the 
comment letters on this exposure draft and is working together with the FASB on 
developing a final standard replacing the existing IFRS 4 soon.  
 
This thesis focuses on the contents of and comments on the second half of the DP. 
The analysis showed that there is no group that generally always agrees or always 
disagrees with the board’s view. The opinions within most of the groups are 
heterogeneous. Most differences in the arguments are due to the nature of the 
commenters. The views of insurers are often based on the kind of insurance 
business they are operating in.  
 
The three building blocks and the CEV are the most controversial topics discussed in 
the comment letters. Questions relating to these topics have a high rate of 
responses. Most commenters support the CEV approach but there is criticism on the 
proposed determination of the CEV. Only a few commenters bring up arguments or 
alternative approaches that have not already been covered in the DP. There is a 
tendency towards supporting most of the board’s views on the second half of the DP. 
 
The commenters’ view on the first half of the DP is similar to the view on the second 
half. All in all, the commenters value highly the board’s efforts on developing an own 
standard for insurance contracts and support the board’s proposals in principle. 
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Appendix C: Abstract (German) 
Das IASB arbeitet an zahlreichen Projekten für die Entwicklung und Verbesserung 
von internationalen Rechnungslegungsstandards. Eines der umfangreichsten 
Projekte der letzten Jahre ist jenes zur Rechnungslegung von 
Versicherungsverträgen. Die Arbeit an diesem Projekt startete 1997 und wurde 
später in zwei Phasen geteilt. Das Ziel der Phase I war es, einen vorläufigen 
Standard mit ersten speziellen Regelungen für Versicherungsverträge zu 
veröffentlichen. Phase II startete 2004 mit dem Vorhaben, den vorläufigen IFRS 4 
der Phase I zu verbessern. Im Mai 2007 gelang dem Board mit der Veröffentlichung 
des Diskussionspapiers “Preliminary Views on Insurance Contracts“ ein großer 
Schritt. Zeitgleich damit forderte das Board die Öffentlichkeit auf, die Inhalte dieses 
Diskussionspapiers bis zum 16. November 2007 zu kommentieren. Insgesamt trafen 
162 Kommentare aus aller Welt ein. Nachdem das Board diese Rückmeldungen 
ausgewertet und weitere Arbeiten rund um das Versicherungs-Projekt durchgeführt 
hatte, veröffentlichte es im Juli 2010 einen entsprechend veränderten Entwurf eines 
Rechungslegungsstandards für Versicherungsverträge. Zurzeit sichtet das Board die 
Kommentare zu diesem Entwurf und arbeitet zusammen mit dem FASB an der 
Entwicklung eines finalen Standards, der den vorhandenden IFRS 4 bald ersetzen 
soll.  
 
Diese Arbeit behandelt vorwiegend die Inhalte des Diskussionspapiers und die 
darauf bezogenen Kommentare. Die Analyse hat gezeigt, dass keine der Gruppen 
die Sichtweise des Boards durchwegs unterstützt oder durchwegs ablehnt. Die 
Meinungen innerhalb der meisten Gruppen sind heterogen. Die meisten 
Unterschiede der Argumente begründen sich durch das Naturell der 
Kommentartoren. Zum Beispiel sind die Sichtweisen von Versicherern oft auf die Art 
ihres Versicherungsgeschäfts bezogen.  
 
Die Three Building Blocks und der CEV sind die strittigsten Themen in den 
Kommentaren. Fragen, die auf diese Themen Bezug nehmen, weisen eine hohe 
Rate an Rückmeldungen auf. Die meisten Kommentatoren unterstützen den CEV 
Ansatz, aber die beschriebene Festsetzung des CEV wird kritisiert. Nur wenige 
Kommentatoren führen Argumente oder Ansätze an, die noch nicht im 
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Diskussionspapier behandelt wurden. Generell wird dazu tendiert, die Sicht des 
Boards auf die zweite Hälfte des Diskussionspapiers zu unterstützen. 
 
Die Sicht der Kommentatoren auf die erste Hälfte des Diskussionspapiers ähnelt der 
Sicht auf die zweite Hälfte. Alles in allem würdigen die Kommentatoren die 
Bemühungen des Boards einen eigenen Standard für Versicherungsverträge zu 
entwickeln und unterstützen prinzipiell die Vorschläge des Boards. 
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